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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from summary judgment. Jurisdiction lies pursuant to Utah Code
§78A-3-102(3)(j).
ISSUE, STANDARD AND PRESERVATION
On March 27, 1902, and subject to a never satisfied condition precedent, several
individuals began incorporating Minnie Maud Reservoir and Irrigation Company, starting
with Articles of Incorporation. (R(2)-802–07)(Addendum 2).1 The agreed purpose,
typical for mutual irrigation companies, was to construct “reservoirs . . . and other means
of controlling and distributing water for irrigation . . . to the stockholders . . . .” (Id.). The
parties agreed that “[Minnie Maud] shall and does hereby purchase, take, receive and
hold all the water rights now held and claimed by the several incorporators hereto, of and
to the waters of said Minnie Maud Creek . . . .” (R(2)-805). Six weeks later, May 12,
1902, several nascent Minnie Maud shareholders conveyed water rights to Minnie Maud
(the “Deed”) (R(2)-1279)(Addendum 3).
Minnie Maud’s corporate existence was conditional: “This corporation shall not be
effective for any of the purposes mentioned herein until at least 3000 shares of the unpaid
portion of capital stock shall have been subscribed.” (“Share Requirement”)(Id.). It is
undisputed that only 2,377 shares issued. (R. 1663).

1

The record in this case consists of two discs. The first disc contains documents
numbered 1-4532. The second disc contains documents numbered 1-2224. All citations to
the record will indicate the disc followed by the page citation, i.e., (R(1)-500) is a citation
to page 500 on the first disc.
1

The state engineer issued a proposed determination (PD) in 1964 in which Minnie
Maud is identified as the owner of a series of irrigation water rights. (“Water
Rights”)(R(2)-1015–32). Several water users objected to the PD, claiming that (1) Minnie
Maud did not exist due to the unsatisfied Share Requirement, and (2) the company did
not control or distribute water. (“Objections”)(R(2)-1052–66).2
The district court ruled on summary judgment that the (attempted) conveyance of
water rights to Minnie Maud (the Deed), alone, waived the Share Requirement, meaning
that the PD correctly identified Minnie Maud as the owner of the Water Rights. (R(2)1673–74).
The issue, preserved at R(2)-1398–1400, 1620–22, 2181, 2202–03, is whether the
district court erred when deciding as a matter of law that the Deed, dated just six weeks
after the Articles, waived the Share Requirement in light of the known, undisputed
circumstances concerning Minnie Maud’s conditional existence and limited function.
Standard: Summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. Delta Canal Co. v.
Frank Vincent Family Ranch, LLC, 2013 UT 69, ¶10, --- P.3d ---, or “de novo.” Bahr v.
Imus, 2011 UT 19, ¶16, 250 P.3d 56. The issues on appeal are legal, requiring this Court
to “determine only whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law and
whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact.”
Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996)(citations omitted). On the factual
element, summary judgment should be denied “if the facts shown by the evidence . . .

The objections sat pending until EnerVest’s predecessor initiated this action under Utah
Code §73-4-24. (R(1)-4085–154).
2

2

support more than one plausible but conflicting inference on a pivotal issue . . . .” Uintah
Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy, 2008 UT 15, ¶19, 179 P.3d 786 (first omission in
original)(citation omitted). A reasonable inference exists when “there is at least a
foundation in the evidence upon which the ultimate conclusion is based,” while “in the
case of speculation, there is no underlying evidence to support the conclusion.” Harding
v. Atlas Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 2012 UT App 236, ¶7, 285 P.3d 1260. “[A]ny doubt
concerning questions of fact, including evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from
the evidence, should be resolved in favor of the [party opposing summary judgment].” 3
Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827, 831 (Utah App. 1989).
The district court decided the case based on waiver, (R(2)-1673–74), typically “a
mixed question of law and fact.” United Park City Mines Co. v. Stitching Mayflower Mtn.
Fonds, 2006 UT 35, ¶21, 140 P.3d 1200. “[W]hether the trial court employed the proper
standard of waiver presents a legal question . . . reviewed for correctness . . . .” Pledger v.
Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, ¶16, 982 P.2d 572 (Utah 1999).

The court decided cross motions, granting Carlson’s and denying EnerVest’s and
Hammerschmid’s. (R(2)-1661–78).
Cross-motions for summary judgment do not ipso facto dissipate factual
issues, even though both parties contend . . . that they are entitled to prevail
because there are no material issues of fact. Rather, cross-motions may be
viewed as involving a contention by each movant that no genuine issue of
fact exists under the theory it advances, but not as a concession that no
dispute remains under the theory advanced by its adversary. In effect, each
cross-movant implicitly contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law, but that if the court determines otherwise, factual disputes exist
which preclude judgment as a matter of law in favor of the other side.
Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 824–25 (Utah App. 1989)(omission in
original)(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
3

3

When implied based on a “course of conduct,” “waiver is a fact-intensive mixed
question.” Lane Myers Constr., LLC v. Nat’l City Bank, 2014 UT 58, ¶49, 342 P.3d 749
(Durham, J., concurring)(citations omitted). If based on a “writing, and no extrinsic
evidence of the meaning of ambiguous terms is presented, waiver is a question of law that
may be resolved on summary judgment.” Id. (citations omitted). Here, the district court
inferred waiver from the Deed alone.4 (R(2)-1673–74). “The de novo standard [of
review] . . . applies regardless of the nature (fact-intensive or not) of the underlying law
governing the parties’ rights.” Bahr, 2011 UT 19, ¶16 (emphasis omitted).
CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
This action is brought under Utah Code §73-4-24, permitting an expedited hearing
on the Objections made under §73-4-11.5 Under Utah Code §§73-4-1 and 73-4-3, water
rights in a given source are determined en masse. Water right claims are submitted,
followed by the State Engineer’s hydrographic survey showing water diversion and use,
followed by the state engineer’s proposed determination of the rights (“PD”). The PD is a
“recommendation” to the district court “of all rights to the use of water of the river
system or water source.” Id. §73-4-11(1), (2)(a). Objections to the PD are filed and
decided. Id. §§73-4-11, -13 -15. The objections may be heard, as they were here, under
§73-4-24. (R(2)-245–49, 262–65).
The waiver cases involving a “writing” concerned express lien waivers. Zions First
Nat’l Bank v. Saxton, 493 P.2d 602, 603 (Utah 1972); Holbrook v. Webster’s Inc., 320
P.2d 661, 663 (Utah 1958).
5
The Petition that began this action under §73-4-24 contains a researched and so far,
undisputed recitation of events, pieced together based on the extant record, explaining the
general course of the larger general determination prior to this proceeding. (R(2)-4085–
4154).
4

4

The PD in this case, issued in 1964, identified Minnie Maud as the owner of the
Water Rights, each of which had a distinct place of use and specific irrigated acres, not an
allocation based on share ownership. (R(2)-1018 –32, 1586–93). The Objections were
timely but were not pursued or otherwise decided until this proceeding.
The district court ordered that the expedited hearing under §73-4-24 be limited to
“the issues timely raised in the 1964 Objections . . . whether the . . . [PD]” correctly listed
“Minnie Maud Reservoir and Irrigation Company as the owner of” the water rights.
(R(2)-478). If the court determined that the PD was correct, “judgment will be entered
and [the] Section 24 Hearing [would be] complete.” 6 (Id.)
The district court entered summary judgment to that effect on January 5, 2016.
(R(2)-1661–78, 1897–98)(Addendum 1). EnerVest timely appealed. (R(2)-1908–09).
FACTS
1. Undisputed Summary Judgment Facts
The court entered summary judgment on January 5, 2016. (R(2)-1661–78). The
following facts are verbatim from that ruling.
In about March of 1902, some users of water from Minnie Maud Creek filed
Articles of Incorporation with the State of Utah. (R(2)-1662). The Articles provide that
“[Minnie Maud] shall and does hereby purchase, take, receive and hold all water rights
now held and claimed by the several incorporators hereto, of and to the waters of said

6

The summary judgment is, therefore, not interlocutory, but is final and appealable. See
Murdock v. Springville Mun. Corp., 878 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1994)(dismissal of
petition filed pursuant to Utah Code §73-4-24 (prior version) was not an interlocutory
order, but was appealable).
5

Minnie Maud Creek in Carbon County, Utah . . . .” (R(2)-805, 1662). In addition, the
“[Water Rights] and canals now owned by the individual appropriators along [Minnie
Maud] creek, who are incorporators hereto, . . . [are] conveyed by the respective owners
thereof to this corporation for 2 thousand 3 hundred and 77 shares of stock . . . .” (R(2)806, 1662).
The Articles state,
That the said water rights and canals now owned by the individual
appropriators along said creek, who are incorporators hereto, are reasonably
worth the sum of Two Thousand Three Hundred and 77 dollars, and said
property is conveyed by the respective owners thereof to this corporation
for 2 thousand 3 hundred and 77 shares of stock at the par value thereof,
issued to the owners and claimants in proportion to the value of their rights
....
(Id.). 2,377 shares were issued for the Water Rights. (Id.).
The Articles further provide that “[t]his corporation shall not be effective for any
of the purposes mentioned herein until at least 3000 shares of the unpaid portion of the
capital stock shall have been subscribed.” (Id.). The Articles state that only 2,377 shares
of Minnie Maud stock were subscribed for and taken by the persons identified therein,
including 260 shares being issued to T.F. Housekeeper. (R(2)-802, 806, 1663).
The Articles state that “[t]he directors may sell [treasury stock] in payment of
work done and for . . . the construction of reservoirs, canals, and other useful and
necessary improvements to the irrigation system of Minnie Maud Creek.” (R(2)-806,
1663). As set forth in the Articles, only 2,377 shares of stock in Minnie Maud were
initially subscribed. (R(2)-1663). There is no direct evidence, either documentary or

6

testimonial, that Minnie Maud ever subscribed or issued any shares in addition to the
original 2,377. (Id.).
On April 11, 1902, the Utah Secretary of State issued a certificate of incorporation
to Minnie Maud. The certificate reads, in part:
and that there has also been filed in my office with said certificate, a copy
of the articles of agreement; and oath or affirmation, certified by said Clerk;
that said articles contain the statement of facts required by law, and that
said corporation is hereby constituted a body corporate, with right of
succession as specified in its said articles of agreement, and is hereby
authorized to exercise all the functions, enjoy all the privileges of a
Corporation, and to transact all business of said Corporation, and to transact
all business of said Corporation, as specified in its said articles of
agreement.
(R(2)-1449, 1663).
By a deed dated May 12, 1902, each of the incorporators conveyed all of his/her
water rights on Minnie Maud Creek to Minnie Maud Reservoir and Irrigation Company.
(R(2)-1279, 1663). Sometime before July 28, 1905, Minnie Maud filed an action “to
determine and quiet its right to the waters of Minnie Maud creek, . . . and to enjoin
[Martha Grames] from interfering with, or from diverting or using, or asserting any right
to the use of [water from Minnie Maud Creek].” (R(2)-1043, 1663). The parties to that
action were Minnie Maud and Martha Grames. (R(2)-1043, 1663–64). Martha Grames
prevailed in the action. (R(2)-1043–45, 1664).
The Court's decree does not purport to determine any water rights on Minnie
Maud Creek other than between the parties to suit, namely, Grames and Minnie Maud.
(R(2)-1664). Grames and the Minnie Maud organizers were not the only water users on
Minnie Maud Creek at the time of suit. (See R(2)1307–08, 1664).
7

“Right after the company was organized, all the water users on Minnie Maud
Creek went to work with hand tools, teams and scrapers to build the reservoir up Minnie
Maud Canyon . . . .” (R(2)-843, 1664). The reservoir was completed in about 1905. (Id.).
It washed out between 1911 and 1913. (R(2)-843–44, 988, 1664). The reservoir stored
high water from Minnie Maud Creek when it was available. (R(2)-843–44, 988 1664). On
one occasion, Ed Lee, one of the incorporators, asked David Anderson and Fred Grames
to open the headgate on the reservoir to release water to Lee for his turn. (Id.).
Anderson testified that he left the area in 1911 at the age of twenty-nine. (R(2)843–44, 1664). Anderson declared that prior to his departure he was unaware of the
existence of a water master and stated that the water users took their water from their own
places of diversion. (Id.) The water was not regulated nor controlled by Minnie Maud.
(Id.).
Between 1902 and 1955, Minnie Maud conducted meetings and issued stock
certificates. (R(2)-1664). On August 1, 1962, T. A. Christensen, purporting to act as a
director of Minnie Maud, wrote a letter to the Utah State Engineer stating that Minnie
Maud had subscribed a total of only 2,377 shares of stock. (R(2)-1358, 1665). There is no
evidence that Minnie Maud attempted to transfer or convey the Water Rights to its
shareholders or others. (R(2)-1665).
The State Engineer issued the Proposed Determination in March, 1964, which
listed Minnie Maud as the owner of the Water Rights. (R(2)-1015–32, 1665). In the fall
of 1964, Bernard Iriart, Albert Thayn, William Dause, Amber Keel, Louis Motte, Clive
and Myrtle Mae Sprouse, and Willis A. and Wilma Hammerschmid, filed objections to
8

the Proposed Determination. (R(2)-1052–66, 1665)(Addendum 6). A common element of
the objections is the claim that the Proposed Determination was incorrect because it listed
Minnie Maud as the owner of the Water Rights. (Id.).
On October 1, 1964, Clive and Myrtle Sprouse and Willis and Wilma
Hammerschmid filed an objection (the “Objection”) to the Proposed Determination.
(R(2)-1062–66, 1665). The Hammerschmid Objection, which was verified by Willis
Hammerschmid, provides that the Sprouses had contracted to sell the real property
identified in the Proposed Determination to the Hammerschmids, “together with the
water rights thereunto belonging including irrigation, domestic, cullinary [sic] and stock
watering belonging to the said land.” (R(2)-1062, 1665).
The Hammershmid Objectors challenged the State Engineer's proposal that title to
the Water Rights be vested in Minnie Maud on several verified bases, including:
a. The land, and the Water Rights applied to the land, belonged to the
Objectors, not to Minnie Maud.
b. Minnie Maud was defunct and non-existent, and had been so for many
years.
c. Minnie Maud failed to carry out the purpose for which it was purported to
have been organized and never distributed water to the Objectors, to any of
the stockholders or any of their predecessors-in-interest.
d. Minnie Maud failed to build or maintain dams, canals or ditches to convey
and distribute the water from Minnie Maud Creek.

9

e. Minnie Maud never levied assessments on or exercised jurisdiction or
control over the water from Minnie Maud Creek.
f. Water under the Water Rights has been diverted by the Objectors and their
predecessors-in-interest from the natural channel by dams and ditches
belonging to them and their predecessors-in-interest, and said water has
been used by them and their predecessors-in-interest under claim of right
upon their lands for irrigation and stock watering purposes without any
control or supervision by Minnie Maud since at least 1918.
g. Legal title to the water rights represented by Claim Nos. 188, 189 and 190
has never been conveyed to Minnie Maud by the Objectors or any of their
predecessors-in-interest.
h. If Minnie Maud ever acquired or otherwise had any right, title or interest in
or to the Water Rights, any such title was lost by the adverse use of the
Objectors and their predecessors-in-interest. Since at least 1918, the
Objectors and their predecessor put the water to beneficial use which was
continuous, open, notorious and adverse to the purported rights of Minnie
Maud.
(R(2)-1062–64, 1666–67).
On November 9, 1974, the Utah Secretary of State issued a Certificate of
Involuntary Dissolution of Minnie Maud. (R(2)-1068, 1667). On June 28, 2000, Michael
Carlson submitted a letter to the Utah Division of Water Rights (Division), agreeing that
Minnie Maud “issued 2,377 shares of stock . . . .” (R(2)-956–60, 1667).
10

2. EnerVest’s Summary Judgment Motion7
In 1950 and 1951, no shareholders attended Minnie Maud’s annual shareholder
meeting. (R(2)-913). It did not hold an annual meeting in 1952 and 1953. Id. One
shareholder attended in 1954. (Id.)
On May 4, 1957, Ernest J. Davis filed a Complaint in the Seventh Judicial District
Court for Carbon County (“1957 Complaint”)(R(2)-1351–56)(Addendum 4).8 The 1957
Complaint named Thomas Christensen, Bud Christensen, T. F. Housekeeper, Louis
Motte, Bernard Iriat, and Amber Keel. (Id.)
The 1957 Complaint alleges:
a. Minnie Maud was organized on March 27, 1902;
b. Minnie Maud issued a total of 2,377 shares, held by the following parties in
the following amounts:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.

Ernest E. Davis, Jr. 1,429 shares
Thomas Christensen 199½ shares
Bud Christensen
199½ shares
T. F. Housekeeper 260 shares
Louis Motte
68 shares
Bernard Iriat
39 shares
Amber Keel
182 shares

(Id.)

Carlson did not dispute any of the facts in EnerVest’s motion. (R(2)-1430–33). See Utah
R. Civ. P. 56(a)(4)(2014)(“Each material fact set forth in the motion . . . that is not
disputed is deemed admitted for the purposes of the motion.”) These undisputed facts are
verbatim (R(2)-888–91), except for omitted duplication with the district court ruling.
8
The issue of Minnie Maud’s existence was not at issue in the 1957 Complaint. Davis
alleged that the defendants were using more water than they were allocated. (R(2)-924–
25). Minnie Maud’s existence was not at issue until defendants’ affirmatively denied its
existence in their answers. (R(2)-928–35, 1317–22).
7
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Defendants each answered and averred that, because the Share Requirement was
never met, Minnie Maud was never a valid corporation, and that their water rights were
superior. 9 (R(2)-928–35, 1317–22)(Addendum 5).
3. Additional Undisputed Facts
Attorney D.A. Frandsen represented Amber Keel, Bernard Iriart, Albert Thayn,
and William C. Dause in the general determination, and Louis Motte and Amber Keel in
the 1957 case. (R(2)-928–35, 943–48). During a hearing in the general determination, the
state engineer directed Frandsen to “check with some of the old timers regarding the
construction and period of use of the reservoir built by [Minnie Maud].” (R(2)-985).
Frandsen obtained two affidavits, from David Anderson and Sheridan Powell. (R(2)-985–
88).
Both of these old timers had much to say about Minnie Maud, and what it did and
did not do. The reservoir washed out around 1911-1913. (R(2)-843–44, 988). Minnie
Maud did not distribute or otherwise control the water after that. (R(2)-844 (“The
irrigation company never had a water master and all the water users took their own water
from their own places of diversion and this water was never regulated or controlled by
the irrigation company.”)). Minnie Maud did not replace the washed out dam. (R(2)-843–
44, 988). Rather, Powell rebuilt it himself and then obtained a right to store water in it.
Only Amber Keel’s answer was attached to EnerVest’s motion. (R(2)-928-35). The
Housekeeper answer was attached to the Hammerschmid’s motion. (R(2)-828–33). The
answers of Housekeeper, the Christensens, and Motte are practically identical in
asserting, “[t]hat by reason of the fact that 3,000 shares of stock have never been
subscribed in the corporation referred to in plaintiff’s Compliant, neither this defendant
nor her predecessors have ever recognized the validity of said corporation or its right to
exercise any corporate powers.” (R(2)-932).
9
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(R(2)-988). Powell’s reservoir, with its 56.36 acre foot capacity, “is on the same site and
has the same capacity as the old Minnie Maud . . . reservoir.” Id. Minnie Maud
apparently had a “water master” prior to the washout. (R(2)-909).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The facts concerning the failed attempt to incorporate Minnie Maud are
undisputed. That is, it is clear that several water users on Minnie Maud Creek drafted the
Articles of Incorporation and subsequently attempted to convey their water rights to
Minnie Maud. As a mutual irrigation company, Minnie Maud’s stated purpose was to
control and distribute water to shareholders.
But Minnie Maud’s incorporation—its power to function—was explicitly
conditioned on a never satisfied condition precedent: “This corporation shall not be
effective for any of the purposes mentioned herein until at least 3000 shares of the unpaid
portion of capital stock shall have been subscribed.” (R(2)-806). The shareholders bound
themselves to this Share Requirement. It was never satisfied, however. Only 2,377 shares
ever issued.
On summary judgment, the parties presented conflicting evidence regarding the
shareholders’ later actions. At least some of the water users acted as though there was a
corporate entity: they conducted meetings and issued stock, and for a time before the
reservoir failed around 1911, the entity may have had a role in water distribution, but
even that is murky. Other evidence demonstrated that Minnie Maud never carried out its
true purpose: water distribution. Rather, each water user controlled their own diversion
from the source based on irrigated acres, not company shares. Despite the competing
13

inferences these facts create, the district court ruled as a matter of law that the Deed, the
first and only attempted conveyance of water rights to Minnie Maud, waived the Share
Requirement.
As a matter of law, the Articles defined and conditioned Minnie Maud’s authority,
including its function. By its plain terms, the Articles instructed the water users to convey
their water rights to Minnie Maud, which had no power to act, and no function, until the
Share Requirement was met. Although the State acknowledged receipt of the Articles and
issued a corporate certificate, nothing in the certificate permitted Minnie Maud to act
outside the strict, and strictly enforced, confines of its Articles. Thus, while the form of
the corporation was complete, its operation, function, and its obligations to the
contracting parties, were not. Those matters depended expressly on the Share
Requirement.
With no direct evidence of waiver, the district court inferred that the Deed waived
the Share Requirement. This was error. The facts demonstrate more than one plausible
inference. Far from waiving the Share Requirement, the only express inference the Deed
supports is the intention to start to comply with the Articles and the Share Requirement.
In fact, Article XV anticipated the Deed. The shareholders gave the Deed knowing full
well that it and the entity could not be effective until the Share Requirement was met. At
least since 1911-(ish), the shareholders distributed their own water without any help from
Minnie Maud, and they disputed Minnie Maud’s existence at every turn: in the 1957
litigation and in their Objections to the PD.
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Additionally, the district court’s waiver ruling is inconsistent with the PD. The PD
divides the Water Rights based on irrigated acres allocated to individual farmers. They,
not Minnie Maud, controlled water diversions. The PD’s hydrographic survey maps
identify these irrigated acres based on the individual water users who owned and farmed
the ground. The water users have distributed the Water Rights based on these irrigated
acres for over 100 years—at least since Minnie Maud’s reservoir failed. Carlson seeks to
upend a century of on the ground water use.
The district court’s ruling permits Carlson to use water he’s never used, and that is
approved for use on land he’s never owned or irrigated. His claim to own 60% of Minnie
Maud’s water falls short—the unfulfilled Share Requirement prevented Minnie Maud
from receiving and holding title to the Water Rights. Accordingly, summary judgment
based on the Deed alone was error and should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
Formed to regulate and distribute water to shareholders, mutual irrigation
companies are a long-standing feature of western water law and distribution.
See Burtenshaw v. Bountiful Irr. Co., 61 P.2d 312, 315 (Utah 1936)(“A mutual, irrigation
company, organized to supply water to its stockholders in proportion to the amount of
their stock, is under the duty of . . . regulating and dividing its [water] among the
stockholders in accordance with their interests . . . .” (citation omitted)). “Water rights are
pooled in a mutual company for convenience of operation and more efficient distribution
. . . .” Genola Town v. Santaquin City, 80 P.2d 930, 936 (Utah 1938). The water users are
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issued stock, entitling them “to demand [an] aliquot share of the water in proportion as
[their] stock holding bears to all the stock.” Id.10
The company owes “a duty to use reasonable care and diligence in maintaining its
canal and keeping it supplied with water, and of regulating and dividing its use among the
shareholders in accordance with their interests.” Swasey v. Rocky Point Ditch Co., 617
P.2d 375, 379 (Utah 1980). These companies must “furnish such a proportion of water to
each of its shareholders as the member of shares bear to the whole number of shares of
the stock of the company.” Id. at 378. They “divide water” among shareholders and
“stand[] as a single appropriator with a duty to protect” shareholder rights. In re Uintah
Basin, 2006 UT 19, ¶36, 133 P.3d 410 (citation omitted).11
Such was Minnie Maud’s intended purpose—“constructing, purchasing and
owning water reservoirs, ditches, and canals, and other means of controlling and
distributing waters for irrigation and domestic use, and for the purpose of appropriating,
purchasing, owning and distributing water for [such uses] to the stockholders . . . .”
(R(2)-802). Shortly after the Articles were signed, certain nascent shareholders purported
to convey by the Deed “all their and each of their rights and claims of every kind and
nature whatsoever, in and to the waters of Minnie Maud Creek” to Minnie Maud. (R(2)-

“[A] mutual water company is a nonprofit corporation that owns diversion or storage
works and delivers water at cost to users who own its stock, and that derives its operating
funds from assessments levied against the stockholders.” Frank J. Trelease, Water Law,
Resource Use and Environmental Protection, Ch. 6 at 612, n. 1. See also 2 S. Wiel, Water
Rights in the Western States §1266 at 1170-71 (3d ed. 1911); Jacobucci v. District Court,
541 P.2d 667, 672-73 (Colo. 1975)(general discussion of mutual irrigation companies).
11
See generally, Wells A. Hutchins, Water Rights Laws in the Nineteen Western States,
564 (Vol. 1 1972), quoting Genola, 80 P.2d at 936.
10
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1279). A reservoir was constructed, but it washed out sometime around 1911-13, and the
company (if it ever did), never regulated or distributed water after that. (R(2)-843–44,
988, 1664). Rather, each user controlled its own diversion from the source based on
irrigated acres, not company shares. (R(2)-843–44, 929–30, 1052–66).
Rather than waive the Share Requirement, the Deed was the first and apparently
only attempt to comply with the Articles, resulting in the only shares—2,377—ever
issued. (R(2)-1279, 1358, 1663). The district court, however, gave the Deed dispositive
weight, ruling as a matter of law that it, alone, waived the Share Requirement. (R(2)1673–74).
Because waiver is so fact-dependent, the first step is to “inquire whether there are
disputed material facts.” IHC Health Servs. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2003 UT 5, ¶6, 73 P.3d
320. If none, this court “considers all undisputed material facts in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party before determining whether the trial court's decision on the
application of the law of waiver to those facts falls within the bounds of its discretion.”
Id. (citation omitted). On summary judgment, the district court may neither weigh
credibility nor assign weight to conflicting evidence. Martin v. Lauder, 2010 UT App
216, ¶14, 239 P.3d 519.
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT RULED INCORRECTLY THAT THE DEED WAIVED
THE SHARE REQUIREMENT.

A. The articles govern corporate existence and power.
In their attempt to incorporate, Minnie Maud’s nascent shareholders complied
with the law. They signed code-compliant Articles, accepted and recognized as such by
17

the state. (R(2)-980–81, 1449). The state’s certificate, of course, confirms only that the
articles “contain the statement of facts required by law, and that said corporation is
hereby constituted a body corporate . . . .” (R(2)-1449). The state does not, and has no
authority to, determine whether any conditions are satisfied, the Share Requirement in
particular, leaving that matter to the contracting parties.
“[T]he intentions of [contracting] parties are controlling,” and unambiguous intent
is “determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may
be interpreted as a matter of law.” Cent. Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assoc., 2002 UT 3,
¶12, 40 P.3d 599 (citations omitted). See also Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four,
Inc., 2009 UT 43, ¶19, 216 P.3d 352 (if terms are “unambiguous, we look no further than
the plain meaning of the contractual language.”).12
Articles of incorporation define and limit corporate authority. Okelberry v. West
Daniels Land Assoc., 2005 UT App 327, ¶14, 120 P.3d 34 (corporation “may not act in
any way not authorized in its . . . articles . . . or bylaws”)(citation omitted). This was just
as true when the effort to form Minnie Maud began. Thompson v. McFarland, 82 P. 478,
480 (Utah 1905)(corporation has only the power its shareholders give it). The articles are
“the basis of a contract . . . between the corporation and its stockholders.” Fower v. Provo
Bench Canal and Irr. Co., 101 P.2d 375, 376 (Utah 1940); see also Salt Lake City v.

See also Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 857 (Utah 1998)(“cardinal rule
in construing . . . a contract is to give effect to the intentions of the parties.” (alteration
and omission in original)(internal quotation marks omitted)). The court does not secondguess the parties; nor does it create an agreement more favorable to either side. Swenson
v. Erickson, 2000 UT 16, ¶19, 998 P.2d 807 (court does not “second-guess the judgment
of covenanting parties”).
12
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Cahoon & Maxfield Irr. Co. 879 P.2d 248, 252 (Utah 1994)(articles governed stock
transactions).
Shareholders cannot confer power on directors that is not rooted in the articles.
Seeley v. Huntington Canal & Ag. Ass’n, 75 P. 367 (Utah 1904). The corporation has
only the powers the articles give it, Park v. Alta Ditch & Canal Co., 458 P.2d 625, 628
(Utah 1969), limiting the directors to their express terms, Seeley, 75 P. at 367, and those
“necessarily implied” to achieve corporate purposes. Park, 458 P.2d at 628. Because
Article XII, §10 of the Utah Constitution limits a corporation to what is “expressly
authorized in its charter, or articles of incorporation,” a “strict interpretation must be
given [those] articles . . . .” Zion’s Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Tropic & E. Fork Irr. Co.
126 P.2d 1053, 1054 (Utah 1942).
The Articles are explicit that Minnie Maud intended to purchase the incorporators’
water rights. The Articles state that Minnie Maud’s existence and purpose was
to construct, purchase, and own, reservoirs, ditches and canals in
Carbon County, Utah, and to purchase, appropriate and receive and
own waters and water rights and to distribute to its several
stockholders waters owned by it, . . . and especially to purchase,
receive and own the canals, waters, and water rights now owned by
the several residents and appropriators of water on and along
Minnie Maud Creek in Nine Mile Canyon, Carbon County, Utah and
it is intended that this corporation shall succeed to the property rights
of said residents and appropriators, in the waters and ditches and
canals of said Minnie Maud Creek.
(Emphasis added) (R(2)-803).
Article XIV states that Minnie Maud “shall and does hereby purchase, take,
receive and hold all the water rights now held and claimed by the several incorporators
19

hereto . . . .” (R(2)-805). At the time the Articles were drafted, the incorporators’ water
rights had already been assessed and valued. Article XV of the Articles states
that the said water rights and canals now owned by the individual
appropriators along said creek, who are incorporators hereto, are
reasonably worth the sum of Two Thousand Three Hundred and 77
dollars, and said property is conveyed by the respective owners
thereof to this corporation for 2 thousand 3 hundred and 77 shares of
stock at the par value thereof, . . . and said 2 thousand 3 hundred and
77 shares of stock are hereby declared to be fully paid up capital
stock.
(R(2)-806).
The very next section, Article XVI, provides the condition precedent, which
captures the entire agreement: “This corporation shall not be effective for any of the
purposes mentioned herein until at least 3000 shares of the unpaid portion of the capital
stock shall have been subscribed.” (Id.). In this context, and by its plain terms, the
incorporators agreed to convey their water rights to Minnie Maud, but that Minnie Maud
could not act—had no function—unless and until the Share Requirement, consisting of
the “unpaid portion of the capital stock” was satisfied. (Id.). It never was.
B. Minnie Maud’s existence was conditioned on an unambiguous and
never-satisfied condition precedent.
Conditions precedent are operative facts “on which the existence of some
particular legal relation depends.” Utah Golf Ass’n. v. North Salt Lake, 2003 UT 38, ¶13,
79 P.3d 919 (citation omitted). Because “[t]he relationship between a voluntary
association and its members is . . . contractual,” Turner v. Hi-Country Homeowners
Ass’n., 910 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Utah 1996)(citation omitted), it follows that a condition
precedent is equally strictly enforced. Terms are considered “in relation to all of the
20

others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none.” Café Rio, Inc. v.
Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27, ¶25, 207 P.3d 1235 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Innerlight, Inc. v. Matrix Group, LLC, is functionally on point. 2009 UT 31, 214
P.3d 854. There, a distributorship agreement contained choice of law and forum selection
clauses and, in a separate section, an express condition precedent. Id. ¶5. Specifically, the
agreement required that any litigation be brought in Florida, using that state’s substantive
law. Id. ¶3. The agreement also provided that Innerlight, the distributor, would enjoy
exclusive distribution rights in the agreed territory, conditioned on “[Innerlight's] written
acceptance of [Matrix's] Product Price List . . . .” Id. ¶15. Innerlight later sued, claiming
that the entire agreement was unenforceable because Matrix never satisfied the condition
precedent, having never providing the Price List. Id.
Reversing summary judgment, and relying on the agreement’s unambiguous
terms, our Supreme Court explained that the forum selection clause was not subject to the
condition precedent (the Price List).13 Id. ¶17. Rather, only the exclusive distributorship
term was its subject. Id. What the district court got wrong in Innerlight is the inverse of
the error here. Innerlight’s condition applied to a single term of the agreement—the
exclusive distributorship term—and the trial court there erred in applying it to the entire
agreement. Id. ¶15.
Specifically, the opinion explains that “the district court's denial of Matrix's motion to
dismiss for improper venue was a necessary predicate to its grant of summary judgment
in favor of Innerlight. In its summary judgment order, the district court specified that “the
venue terms ... under the [Contract] are not enforceable because the [Contract] is an
ineffective executory contract.” Innerlight, 2009 UT 31, ¶9.
13
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Here, Minnie Maud’s very existence and power to function, the entire voluntary
association, and all of the Articles’ terms, were expressly conditioned on the Share
Requirement. (R(2)-806). Minnie Maud was not “effective for any purposes mentioned,”
which included water right ownership and water distribution, short of that requirement.
(R(2)-805–06).14 The Share Requirement is unambiguous, and everyone agrees it was
never satisfied. Only 2,377 shares issued. (R(2)-802, 806, 1358, 1662–63, 1671).
C. The Deed was inoperative because Minnie Maud was not “effective”
for any purpose.
As a matter of law, entities that do not exist, that have no power to function,
cannot own anything. Sharp v. Riekhof, 747 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1987)(attempted
conveyances of property interests to nonexisting entities are void). “[A] deed of
conveyance is void unless the grantee named is capable of taking and holding the
property named in the deed.” Id. (citation omitted). There could not be an effective
conveyance to Minnie Maud, or an award of water rights under the PD for that matter,
unless and until the condition precedent was satisfied.
The incorporators attempted to convey to an entity that according to their own
agreement did not yet exist and could not function for that, or any, purpose. “Such
attempted conveyances are void.” Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, ¶22, 979 P.2d 338
See Oxford American Dictionary 249 (1999)(defining “effective” as “1. having a
definite or desired effect. . . . 3. a. actual; existing in fact rather than officially or
theoretically. b. actually usable; realizable; equivalent in its effect . . . 4. coming into
operation”); see also Black’s Dictionary 628 (10th ed. 2014)(defining “effective” as “1.
(Of a statute, order, contract, etc.) in operating at a given time <effective June 1>. A . . .
contract is often said to be effective beginning (and perhaps ending) at a designated time.
. . . 3. Productive; achieving a result”).
14
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(citation omitted), overruled in part on other grounds by USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp,
2016 UT 20, ¶107, 372 P.3d 629; Julian v. Petersen, 966 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah App.
1998)(“It is well-settled that an attempted conveyance of land to a nonexisting entity is
void.”). A void act is beyond rescue by ratification or acceptance. Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008
UT 37, ¶18, 189 P.3d 51(explaining void versus voidable: “A contract or a deed that is
void cannot be ratified or accepted, and anyone can attack its validity in court.”).
The Deed embodying the attempted conveyance to Minnie Maud was not merely
voidable. It was void, meaning that it had “no legal effect and was never valid.” A legal
nullity.

M.F. v. J.F., 2013 UT App 247, ¶15, 312 P.3d 946, citing Black’s Law

Dictionary 1709 (9th ed. 2009)(defining “void” as “[o]f no legal effect” and noting that
“void can be properly applied only to those provisions that are of no effect whatsoever”).
Minnie Maud was to acquire its shareholders’ water rights. (R(2)-805–06). That
provision, essential to formation, was just as subject to the Share Requirement as the rest
of the Articles, i.e., corporate function itself. One of Minnie Maud’s “purposes” was to
“succeed to the property rights of said residents and appropriators, in the waters and
ditches and canals of . . . Minnie Maud Creek,” but only if the Share Requirement was
met. (R(2)-803). Immediate acquisition of the water rights was an express purpose:
Minnie Maud “does hereby purchase, take, receive and hold all the water rights now held
and claimed by the several incorporators . . . together with all canals, dams, [and other
infrastructure] used therewith throughout the whole system . . . ,” but only after a
satisfied Share Requirement. (R(2)-805).
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Minnie Maud did not function for any purpose—including its stated purposes of
acquiring water rights and distributing water—unless it reached the Share Requirement.
(R(2)-806). The Deed, dated just six weeks after the Articles, could not operate to convey
anything because the purported grantee had no function—no power—as a matter of
substantive contract rights among the very parties attempting the conveyance: “This
corporation shall not be effective for any of the purposes mentioned herein until at least
3000 shares of the unpaid portion of the capital stock shall have been subscribed.”)). See,
e.g., W.L. Wells Co. v. Gastonia Cotton Mfg. Co., 198 U.S. 177, 186 (1905)(“[I]f the
charter of the company had made it a condition precedent to its becoming a corporation
that a certain amount of capital stock should be subscribed and paid for, a compliance
with that condition would have been necessary before the company would have become a
corporation entitled to sue and be sued in the courts of the United States.”).
Corporate existence—the form of the entity—was indeed acknowledged when the
corporate certificate was issued, but only because the Articles said all the right things.
(R(2)-1449 (“[S]aid articles contain the statement of facts required by law[.]”). Nothing
in the certificate, however, attempted to construe, and it certainly could not waive, the
Share Requirement, which no party contends was satisfied.
D. The Deed did not waive the Share Requirement.
The district court ruled that the Deed, alone, waived the Share Requirement.
Waiver is the “intentional relinquishment of a known right.” Soter’s, Inc. v. Deseret Fed.,
etc., 857 P.2d 935, 937 (Utah 1993). There must be an “existing right,” “knowledge” of
it, and “intent” to give it up. Id. Waiver must be distinct, either express or implied. Id. “A
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fact finder need only determine whether the totality of the circumstances warrants the
inference of relinquishment.” Id. at 941 (citation omitted).
Soter’s explains:
Because the essence of waiver is relinquishment, the statement in
Phoenix indicated that the intentional relinquishment of a right must
be distinctly made. With this legal requirement, we ensured that
waiver would not be found from any particular set of facts unless it
was clearly intended . . . . although the necessary intent may be clear
or distinct when there is an express waiver, such intent may be more
difficult to prove when waiver is to be implied from conduct or
silence. Consistent with this point is the general principle in our case
law that “[m]ere silence is not a waiver unless there is some duty or
obligation to speak.”
Id. at 940 (citation omitted), citing Phoenix, Inc. v. Heath, 61 P.2d 308 (Utah 1936).
The Share Requirement is an unambiguous and existential express condition
precedent controlling the entire venture. The Deed says nothing about waiver and does
not mention the Share Requirement. (R(2)-1279). Rather, the Deed is an overt act
consistent with the undisputed attempt to incorporate, coming as it did just six weeks
after the Articles were signed, and it is consistent with the express purpose of
incorporation—shareholder water distribution. (R(2)-802–06, 1279).
In other words, no one disputes that the parties intended and tried to form a
corporation, and for purposes of the then-Utah Code, they did, which is to say that, as far
as the State of Utah was concerned, the Articles were code-compliant. (R(2)-1449, 1471–
72). The form of the corporation was complete, but its substantive operation, its
prospective function, its power, and the obligations of the contracting parties, were not.
Those matters depended expressly on the Share Requirement.
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Summary judgment, of course, involves no fact finding. Rather, the undisputed
facts must satisfy the elements of waiver, if not directly, then by inference. Because the
Deed did not expressly waive anything, the district court had to infer waiver.
An inference is “the act of passing from one judgment to another, or from a belief
or cognition to a judgment.” State v. Simmons, 759 P.2d 1152, 1158 n.11 (Utah 1988). It
is a “conclusion; a deduction” culled from established fact. Id. To “infer” is to “accept or
derive as a consequence, conclusion, or probability . . . .” Id.; see also State v. Hester,
2000 UT App 159, ¶16, 3 P.3d 725 (“While it is sometimes subtle, there is in fact a
difference between drawing a reasonable inference and merely speculating about
possibilities.”), cert denied, 9 P.3d 170 (Utah 2000); id. (defining “inference” and
“speculation”).15 See USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2010 UT 31, ¶65, 235 P.3d 749
(“inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence . . . may create a genuine issue of
material fact”).16
Even when the “objective facts are undisputed [that] does not mean that no
genuine issues remain as to those facts.” Id. ¶33. Thus, “[a] district court is precluded

“An inference is a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical
consequence from them. . . . [A] deduction as to the existence of a fact which human
experience teaches us can reasonably and logically be drawn from proof of other facts.
[While], speculation is . . . the act or practice of theorizing about matters over which there
is no certain knowledge.” Hester, 2000 UT App 159, ¶16 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
16
By definition, inferences must be reasonable, reached “by the process of logic and
reason, based upon common experience . . . .” Wyatt v. Baughman, 239 P.2d 193, 198-99
(Utah 1951). An inference must be rooted in “basic facts which remain in the case” Id. at
199. See also Black’s Law Dictionary 710 (10th ed. 2014)(“Inferential fact. A fact
established by conclusions drawn from other evidence rather than from direct testimony
or evidence; a fact derived logically from other facts.”)
15
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from granting summary judgment 'if the facts shown by the evidence . . . support more
than one plausible but conflicting inference on a pivotal issue in the case . . . particularly .
. . if the inferences depend upon subjective feelings or intent.’” Uintah Basin Med. Ctr.,
2008 UT 15, ¶19 (first omission in original)(citation omitted). A “dispute” about
“understanding, intention, and consequences of” established facts “may defeat summary
judgment.” USA Power, 2010 UT 31, ¶32 (citation omitted).
Here, the district court ruled as a matter of law that the Deed was dispositive,
overlooking other plausible, conflicting inferences. The facts invoked by the district
court, however, form a mere tautology. That the contracting parties went about the
business of doing what they agreed to do—start a company, build a dam, issue shares,
elect directors and appoint officers, and even a water master (R(2)-802–07, 843–44, 909,
988, 1456), and early in the process conveying their water rights, (R(2)-1279), all of
which is undisputed—does not indicate a waiver of anything. These are the acts of
incorporating, not the acts of waiving the terms and conditions of the express agreement
to incorporate.
The Share Requirement identifies an express right, which is to say that it preserved
the parties’ right not to associate unless and until their fixed conditions were satisfied.
Waiver of that express right requires more than an early, isolated instance of nonenforcement, particularly where the transfer of water rights was expressly contemplated
in the same Articles and occurred essentially contemporaneously with the Articles, just
six weeks later. (R(2)-802–07, 1279).
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Far from waiving the Share Requirement, the only express inference the Deed
supports is the intent to start to comply with the Articles and the Share Requirement. The
Deed reflects the first and apparently only conveyance of property to the corporation. The
Articles required water right conveyance. (R(2)-805–06). Article XV itself specifically
contemplated the incorporator’s conveyance of their water rights in exchange for 2,377
shares. (Id.) This conveyance was so expected that the Articles themselves state that these
2,377 shares were “hereby declared to be fully paid up capital stock,” even though the
Articles preceded the Deed by six weeks. (Id.).
Until now, the parties and the district court have assumed that the Share
Requirement would be met if 3000 total shares were subscribed. But a closer reading
suggests otherwise. Though they had yet to be conveyed, Article XV states that the 2,377
shares were declared “to be fully paid up capital stock.” (R(2)-806). The Share
Requirement, in Article XVI, comes next. The Articles are clear: although these 2,377
shares had been “fully paid up,” “the corporation shall not be effective until at least 3000
shares of the unpaid portion of the capital stock” are issued. (Id.)(emphasis added). Thus,
it is reasonable to infer that the parties intended that 5,377 shares were necessary for the
corporation to exist—indeed, requiring two-thirds of the capital stock to be issued before
the corporation could function. (R(2)-803 (“The amount of the capital stock of this
corporation shall be Eight Thousand Dollars divided into Eight Thousand shares . . . .”)).
Whichever total the parties intended—3,000 or 5,377 shares—it is undisputed that the
Share Requirement was not met.
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That the shareholders never waived the Share Requirement is an equally plausible
inference to be drawn from the evidence, which only begins with the Deed. Later events,
starting after the reservoir failure, which seems to have been the last straw for Minnie
Maud because it did not distribute water (its primary purpose) after that, suggest that
water users abandoned the corporate venture. Their successors certainly saw things that
way. They litigated that issue to a standstill, (R(2)-928–35, 1317–22, 1407–15), and
emphasized the point with the Objections. (R(2)-1052–66).
The water users disputed Minnie Maud’s existence at every turn where that issue
was pressed: the 1957 litigation (R(2)-928–35, 1317–22) and in the Objections. (R(2)1052–66). At best, those who did attempt to convey their rights endeavored to move
forward as a corporate entity. They held meetings, issued shares, and elected
management. (R(2)-802–07, 843–44, 909, 988, 1456). But that group could not waive
the Share Requirement for all other Minnie Maud Creek water users. Other users diverted
and managed their own water on their own land. (R(2)-843–44, 929–30, 1052–66).
Thus the danger of invoking the Deed alone to show waiver. This is, after all,
summary judgment. “Because waiver is intensely fact-dependent, district courts should
exercise care when granting summary judgment on this issue.” IHC Health Servs., 2008
UT 36, ¶15. “Under this legal standard, a fact finder need only determine whether the
totality of the circumstances ‘warrants the inference of relinquishment.’” Soter’s, 857
P.2d at 941 (citation omitted). These “circumstances” are the fact pool from which
inferences are drawn. “The word ‘genuine’ indicates that a district court is not required to
draw every possible inference of fact, no matter how remote or improbable, in favor of
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the nonmoving party. Instead, it is required to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the nonmoving party.” IHC Health Servs. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 36, ¶19, --P.3d ---.
Genuine fact issues mean that “reasonable minds could differ” on a given
“material issue.” Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 655 (Utah 1994)
(citation omitted). For example, in Ellsworth Paulsen Constr. v. 51-Spr, LLC, 2006 UT
App 353, 144 P.3d 261, aff’d., 2008 UT 28, this court found error after the district court
inferred on summary judgment on a material issue—whether parties were obligated to
share losses as part of a joint venture. Id. ¶¶14, 18. Affidavit testimony raised a different
but plausible interpretation of the agreement. Id. ¶17. Summary judgment was not
available because “there [we]re other equally plausible inferences to be drawn from the
evidence.” Id. ¶18.
Here, because the Deed is consistent with the purpose of incorporating in the first
place (R(2)-802–06, 1279), it cannot serve, at least not by itself, as a waiver of a
condition precedent to corporate function. It cannot be as a matter of law, in other words,
that an attempt to comply with the Articles, specifically Article XV, constitutes a waiver
of the explicit condition contained in Article XVI and that captures the entire
incorporation effort. The Deed is just one of an array of circumstantial evidence from
which the district court could, and on remand must, draw inferences.
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT’S LEGAL CONCLUSION OF WAIVER IS
INCONSISTENT WITH THE GENERAL DETERMINATION AND THE PD.

Since 1919, water rights in a given source or drainage are determined en masse.
Utah Code §73-4-1, et seq. A general determination “confer[s] legitimacy on those
claiming lawful ownership based on beneficial use of the public waters of Utah under our
state’s doctrine of prior appropriation.” Penta Creeks, LLC v. Olds, 2008 UT 25, ¶7, 182
P.3d 362, citing Utah Code §73-4-3. “The purpose of the general adjudication process is
to prevent piecemeal litigation regarding water rights and to provide a permanent record
of all such rights by decree.” Jensen v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287, 289 (Utah 1992).
Since 1903, the state engineer and the district courts evaluate water right claims to,
among other things, determine beneficial use. A general determination (sometimes called
a general adjudication) of water rights tests approved rights against actual beneficial use.
“In all such cases the court shall proceed to determine the water rights involved in the
manner provided by [Title 73, chapter 4].” §73-4-3(6).
Once commenced, water users on the system submit to the state engineer any
claims in the defined area, §73-4-5, and failure to do so is a permanent bar. §73-4-9. The
state engineer conducts a hydrographic survey of the system and the irrigated acres and
evaluates the claims. §73-4-3(3)(a). See also In re Escalante Drainage Area, 355 P.2d 64,
65 n.2 (Utah 1960)(“A hydrographic survey is a very extensive survey made by qualified
engineers.”). Specifically, the state engineer “survey[s] the water source and the ditches,
canals, wells, tunnels, [and] other works diverting water from the water source.” §73-43(3)(a). The survey depicts actual use, not what a user claims or what a certificate or
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prior decree says. See, generally, Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, ¶29-32,
84 P.3d 1134 (general determination process).
The state engineer then prepares a PD of rights for the area. §73-4-11. The PD is a
“recommendation” to the court, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Op.
Co., 2004 UT 67, ¶41, 98 P.3d 1, which is the final arbiter of the water rights. American
Fork Irr. Co. v. Linke, 239 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1951). A party disputing the PD objects,
and the court decides the issue. Following a protest period, “or if all objections have been
resolved, the district court must enter judgment rendering the [PD] the final adjudication
of water rights for the given area.” Green River Canal Co. v. Olds, 2004 UT 106, ¶7, 110
P.3d 666, citing §73-4-12. Failure to protest a PD bars further challenge. Butler, Crockett
&
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67, ¶22, 98 P.3d 1. Until modified by the court and unless a prior decree governs, the
state engineer distributes the water according to the PD, either as submitted or as
modified, until a decree is entered. §73-4-11(3).
A general determination, then, resolves the inevitable disputes and uncertainties
that brew over time in a given drainage among water users and determines the extent of
existing rights. See Jensen, 844 P.2d at 289. Water use changes, points of diversion are
moved, and land goes in and out of irrigation and other uses. See §73-3-3 and -8
(application process for changing water use).
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A. The PD divides water based on irrigated acres belonging to specific
farmers.
Water users with claims in a general determination must identify the particulars of
their use. They must identify flow rate, the nature of use, and if they claim a storage right
“the quantity of water stored in acre-feet,” and the time of year of use and “such other
facts as will clearly define the extent and nature of the appropriation claimed . . . .” Utah
Code §73-4-5(1). If the use is for irrigation, the claimant must show “the area of land
irrigated” and other indices of irrigation use. Id. §73-4-6.17 Precision matters. Hardy v.
Beaver Cnty. Irr. Co., 234 P. 524, 526 (Utah 1924)(“While the respondents allege in their
pleadings that it was also their custom to use the water which flowed in the river during
the winter for irrigation purposes, the evidence fails to show, with any degree of
certainty, that there was any general use of the water in that manner.”); State Engineer v.
Shepherd, 2005 UT App 450, ¶9, 128 P.3d 6 (although the parties asserted that they used
the water for their livestock, pasture, and orchard, they did not “clearly define” the place,
manner, or extent of such use)).
Although Minnie Maud appears to have operated a reservoir until around 1911-13
(R(2)-843–44, 1664), no reservoir storage right appears in the PD, a glaring but telling
fact about whether or to what extent Minnie Maud had any function. (R(2)-1018–32).
Rather, the PD identifies specific irrigated acres where the water may be used (and has
always been used) on property not owned by Minnie Maud, but owned by the individual
17

Since at least 1919, beneficial use for irrigation has been measured by irrigated acres.
See Ch. 67, §42 Laws of Utah (1919)(“If the proposed use is for irrigation, the [water
right] application shall show . . . the total acreage . . . and the character of the soil.”)(now
codified at Utah Code §73-3-2(2)(a)).
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irrigators. (R(2)-1586–96; see also Addendum 718). The PD says nothing about company
shares and never purports to define Minnie Maud’s service area. (Id.) This is important.
Irrigation companies are a “single appropriator” that distributes water to shareholders.
Those shareholders, however, may take their water at any point along the company
source or within that area. Indeed, the company may be required to get the water to the
shareholder. Syrett v. Tropic & E. Fork Irr. Co., 125 P.2d 955, 957 (Utah 1942)(Unless
otherwise specified, “a stockholder should be entitled to receive his proportionate amount
of water at any reasonable point along the canal system.”).
The hydrographic survey maps here conflict with the PD. They are consistent
regarding acres allocated to each water right. The inconsistency is that the PD identifies
Minnie Maud, while the map shows property owners. The PD correctly identifies
irrigated acres and the water users who owned and farmed that ground. (Addendum 7;
R(2)- 1586–96). But the PD then identifies Minnie Maud as the water right owner rather
than the farmers who diverted and used the water. (R(2)-1018–32). The water rights are
identified individually, based on precise acreage amounts, and the maps identify property
owners. (R(2)-1018–32, 1586–96; Addendum 7). We know that at least since the
beginning of the nineteen-teens that Minnie Maud did not distribute or otherwise control

On November 4, 2016, this court granted appellant’s motion to supplement the record,
and directed the district court to “prepare and transmit to this court a supplemental record
consisting of the materials provided to the court by both parties at the time of the hearing
on the parties’ summary judgment motions.” (Order at 2). Addendum 7 contains the
documents appellant provided to the district court at the summary judgment hearing, as
well as the relevant portions of the transcript explaining these documents.
18
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the water. Rather, the individual irrigators diverted from the stream directly to their
respective properties. (R(2)-843–44, 929–30, 1052–66).19
B. Water use and allocation depended on irrigated acres, not Minnie
Maud shares.
The crux of the dispute concerns rights to water, how it is used and where it is
(and has been) used. That is, believing that his rights depend on Minnie Maud shares,
Carlson seeks a result at war with the PD’s mapping of, and recommendation for, actual
water use. He explains it very clearly:
[W]ould you please amend the Division’s records to show Michael
M. Carlson as the owner of 60.12% of water right Nos. 90-24, 90184, 90-185, 90-186, 90-187, 90-188, 90-189, 90-190, 90-191, 90196, 90-197, and 90-299.
(R(2)-960).
If the summary judgment stands, Carlson will be authorized to use water he’s
never used on land he’s never owned or irrigated. The water rights he calls out, and of
which he claims 60%, have been used by others and their successors on their own land
for more than a century. (Compare R(2)-1586–93 and Addendum 7, with R(2)-957–60).
Anderson states that, while unsure of the basis for Minnie Maud share distribution,
shares were distributed based on irrigated acres. (R(2)-843–44). Even this speculation

19

Although statutory, general determinations are a species of quiet title, where water
rights are confirmed based on actual, beneficial use. Butler, 2004 UT 67, ¶¶24, 30.
Minnie Maud was long an abandoned effort by the time the PD issued in 1964. It is not
clear why the PD identifies Minnie Maud as the water right owner. Because the unmet
Share Requirement was the mandatory condition precedent to its very existence,
however, Minnie Maud could not acquire anything by virtue of the PD. That water right
ownership designation was just as void as the Deed. Sharp, 747 P.2d at 1046 (attempted
property conveyance to nonexisting entities is void).
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does not square with the PD. The PD recommended that water rights 90-197, 90-299, 90186, 90-187, 90-188, 90-189, 90-190, 90-191, 90-24, 90-196, 90-184, and 90-185 be in
the name of Minnie Maud. (R(2)-1018–32). The PD also assigned each of these rights to
specific ground, owned by individual irrigators, where the water was used, identifying
specific acreages. (R(2)-1586–96; Addendum 7).
The hydrographic survey maps identify which water rights may be used on which
acres:
Water Rights
90-197, 90-299
90-186, 90-187
90-188, 90-189
90-190, 90-191
90-24, 90-196
90-184, 90-185

Acreage
148.29 acres
11 acres
67.6 acres
26 acres
51.1 acres
98.53 acres
Total acres: 402.52

(Id.)
Only the 148.29 acres assigned to water rights 90-197 and 90-299 are
encompassed in the land that Carlson and his predecessor own(ed). (Id.; R(2)-1598–
1617). And only the 51.1 acres assigned to water rights 90-24 and 90-196 is encompassed
within the land owned by EnerVest and its predecessor. (R(2)-1586–96; Addendum 7).
The lands do not overlap. Carlson does not own and has never owned any of the acreage
associated with any of the water rights except those two—90-197 and 90-299. (R(2)1598–1617). Therefore, the land Carlson owns includes 148.29 acres of the total 402.52
acres assigned to Minnie Maude in the PD. This represents just 36.84% of the irrigated
acres of all the water rights assigned to Minnie Maud.
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Carlson has never claimed to own more than 1,429 of the 2,377 issued shares.
(R(2)-959–60). Therefore, Carlson owned, at least theoretically, 60.11% of the total
possible shares. Neither Carlson nor his predecessors have ever owned 60.11% of the
irrigated acres to which the PD assigns the water rights. This is the essence of the conflict
that persists if the PD’s designation that Minnie Maude owns the water rights is allowed
to stand.
Here, however, the PD assigns each of the water rights in the name of Minnie
Maud to very specific properties on which the water has been and may be used. The
authorized place of use is one of the critical elements of any water right. See, e.g., Utah
Code §73-3-17(“The certificate issued under this section is prima facie evidence of the
owner's right to use the water in the quantity, for the purpose, at the place, and during the
time specified therein, subject to prior rights.”); Ruth B. Hardy Revocable Trust v. Eagle
Mountain City, 2012 UT App 352, 295 P.3d 188.20
The hydrographic survey maps, which are part of the PD, identify these specific
authorized places of use and their owners, none of which are Minnie Maud. (R(2)-1586–
96; Addendum 7). The PD’s water right allocation is based on irrigated acres owned by
the individual users, which has nothing to do with Minnie Maud shares. (R(2)-844, 1586–
93; Addendum 7).
Thus, although Minnie Maud is identified as the water right owner, the PD’s
allocation of the water itself was based on irrigated acres belonging to and irrigated

20

Utah Div. of Water Rights, Water Right Information, available at http://www.water
rights.utah.gov/wrinfo/ (last revised July 19, 2011).
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exclusively by the individual users, not any actual or purported corporate shares. The
rights are acreage-based, limited, as always and everywhere, by beneficial use. Utah
Code §73-1-3 (“Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of all rights to
the use of water in [Utah]”). This is consistent with the practice at the time that the water
was distributed based on property ownership—irrigated acres—not share ownership.
(R(2)-844, 1586–93; Addendum 7).21 Carlson has never used, beneficially or otherwise,
any of the water identified in the PD on the land he’s never owned.
The parties to the 1957 litigation stipulated in August of that year that the water
would be distributed according to the following specified irrigated acre amounts:
 Louis Motte, 27 acres;
 Amber Keel, 50 acres;
 T. F. Housekeeper, 65 acres;
 Christensens, 74 acres;
 Ernest Davis, 120 acres.
(R(2)-1407–09).
Tellingly, the acres total 336, of which Ernest Davis is allocated 120, or 35.7%.
This is very close to the 36.84% of the irrigated acres assigned to Carlson’s property in
the PD. (Addendum 7; R(2)-1586–96).
It is these facts from which the compelling inferences are drawn: Despite the
attempt to incorporate, the condition precedent was not met, the water users (who would
Amber Keel’s Answer in the 1957 litigation states “that for more than 70 years” the
water was diverted “as they now divert and use said waters.” (R(2)-929).
21
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have been shareholders) allocated and used water according to irrigation on their own
ground, at least after the dam failed. That’s what Anderson states (R(2)-843–44), what
the answers in the 1957 litigation (R(2)-828–33, 928–35) and the Objections (R(2)-1052–
66) assert, what they stipulated to when staying the 1950’s litigation (R(2)-1407–15), and
it is how the PD allocated actual water use. (Addendum 7; R(2)-1586–1617).
Taken to its logical conclusion, Carlson’s theory that water should be allocated
according to shares gives him water that has always been, and may only be, used on
property he neither owns nor claims to own and on which he has no right to irrigate.
(R(2)-956–60 (explaining that Carlson’s right is based on share ownership, not an interest
in the irrigated acres corresponding to the discreet water rights); R(2)-1598 – 1617
(showing Carlson’s chain of title, which does not include any land associated with the
authorized place of use for the EnerVest water rights); R(2)-1586–93 (showing that
Carlson’s predecessor in interest, Glen Allred, owned properties associated with water
rights 90-197 and 90-299, that did not overlap with the EnerVest properties associated
with water rights 90-24 and 90-196); see also Addendum 7).
He would acquire here more water than he could have ever had as a Minnie Maud
shareholder.
C. Short of the Share Requirement, Minnie Maud had no legal ability to
acquire or own the Water Rights identified in the PD.
Although statutory, general determinations are a species of quiet title, where water
rights are confirmed based on actual, beneficial use. In re Bear River Drainage Area, 271
P.2d 846, 848 (Utah 1954)(“[W]ater rights are property rights and a general
39

determination is in essence an action to quiet title to property rights.”). Minnie Maud was
long an abandoned effort by the time the PD issued in 1964. (R(2)-828–33, 928–35). It is
not clear why the PD identifies Minnie Maud as the water right owner. Because the
unmet Share Requirement was the mandatory condition precedent to any function or
purpose it could have had, however, Minnie Maud could not acquire anything by virtue
of the PD. The PD’s water right ownership designation was just as void as the Deed. See
Sharp, 747 P.2d at 1046.
The foregoing discussion—the purposes of Minnie Maud and the general
determination—sets the boundaries of available inferences—the “totality of the
circumstances”—to explain the parties’ conduct. This Court and our Supreme Court
explain these matters (general determinations and mutual irrigation companies) with a
century of consistent gloss. When these larger principles are added, the compelling
inference is clear: A handful of farmers joined forces to better their irrigation fortunes.
For reasons we may never know, they expressly conditioned their relationship, leaving
nothing to chance, owing each other nothing if the condition is not met. “Until” it is,
Minnie Maud had no function and no power.
A corporation exists only on the terms to which its owners agree. The district
court’s focus on the Deed, an early event considering that Minnie Maud’s existence was
squarely at issue in 1957, (R(2)-921–35, 1583–84), at the expense of events before and
since the 1957 Action, is not just drawing inferences; it is weighing them. That is, other
facts and entirely reasonable inferences were presented and argued (see, e.g., R(2)-1398 –
1400, 1403, 1623), but the district court seized on one, giving it dispositive weight. That
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was the error, the selection of one above other just as reasonable inferences that
discovery and a full trial would cull.
Something spurred Davis into action in 1957, when he alleged that others were
using his water, followed by a claim that Minnie Maud was a going concern despite an
existential disagreement with those Davis claimed were its owners, (R(2)-921–26), an
unusual litigation posture, to be sure. Perhaps it was two things about to converge: he
owned the bulk of the Minnie Maud shares, and a PD was in the works (Id.; R(2)-1411–
14). If he could get Minnie Maud identified as the water right owner, he controls a lot of
water on land he’s never owned or farmed. (Addendum 7; R(2)- 1586–96, 1598–1617).
This is a fact because that is exactly what Carlson gets if he prevails. (R(2)-2156).
Perhaps Davis (he had motive and opportunity) gave a copy of the Deed, or the corporate
certificate, to the state engineer, who then understandably relied on it in the PD.
Either way, those who litigated Davis to a standstill to await the PD then promptly
objected to the part where it says what Davis (and Carlson) needed it to say. (R(2)-1052–
66). The next question is, why they did not immediately pursue the Objections. One
answer is, they were not highly motivated. Minnie Maud was already irrelevant to them.
As they saw it, they diverted and controlled their own water on their own land for many
years, (R(2)-843–44, 929–30, 1052–66), just like the PD describes. (R(2)-1586–96;
Addendum 7). They were beneficially using the water without Minnie Maud while their
Objections preserved the issue. Utah Code §73-4-11(2). They continued using their water
as they always had, (R(2)-843–44, 929–30, 988, 1052–66), so pursuing the Objections
was understandably not a priority. General determinations are not rocket docket cases.
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Time was on their side because every day they diverted, controlled and used the water
without Minnie Maud involvement was further evidence that the water was theirs and
that there was no Minnie Maud.
These circumstances raise at least one equally important question: Why weren’t
the water rights conveyed back if Minnie Maud never functioned pursuant to the
Articles? One answer is that they did not have to be. These parties, who were very
specific about the terms of their voluntary association, are deemed to know and
incorporate the law governing the subject matter of their transaction. Hall v. Warren, 632
P.2d 848, 850 (Utah 1981).22 Without 3,000 shares from the “unpaid portion,” there is no
Minnie Maud capable of functioning, including owning property, according to the only
agreement—the Articles—capable of establishing corporate power. With no functioning
Minnie Maud, the Deed lacks a grantee “capable of holding title.” See Kelly v. Hard
Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, ¶23 n.5, 87 P.3d 734.
Conveyances to entities that do not exist are void. That knowledge, imputed under
the law, explains why there is (apparently) no return deed. An entity that cannot own
property also cannot convey it. It was not required as a matter of law. That is how

“Contracting parties are presumed to contract in reference to the existing law; indeed,
they are presumed to have in mind all the existing laws relating to the contact, or to the
subject matter thereof. Thus, it is commonly said that all existing applicable or relevant
and valid statutes, ordinances, regulations, and settled law of the land at the time a
contract is made become a part of it and must be read into it just as if an express
provision to the effect were inserted therein, except where the contract discloses a
contrary intention . . . .” Hall, 632 P.2d at 850 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
22
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inferences should be drawn when summary judgment is on the line. The analysis, and
resulting legal theory, must account for all of the circumstances.
CONCLUSION
Isolating, as the district court did, one link in a lengthy chain of events, many with
legal significance (such as the PD’s designation of irrigated acres owned by individual
users), and bestowing on it dispositive meaning, sacrifices substance to form. When
waiver is the issue, a single act is rarely dispositive. Rather, “the totality of the
circumstances [must] warrant[] the inference of relinquishment.” Soter’s, 857 P.2d at
942.
Here, they do not. Minnie Maud may have distributed water until the dam failed,
but even that period of time can be explained. The incorporators were still (presumably)
working to reach the critical mass of shareholders on which corporate function depended.
Subsequent events, however, in light of the never-satisfied Share Requirement, tell the
real story. The irrigators diverted their water and irrigated their land, exactly as the PD
depicts. Summary judgment based on the Deed alone was error and should be reversed.
November 14, 2016
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Addendum 1

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the matter of the General Determination of

Ruling on the Parties' Cross-Motions for
Summary Judgment

all the Rights, Both Surface and
Underground, within the Drainage Area of the
Uintah Basin.

Civil No. 560800056
NINE MILE CREEK DIVISION
AREA 90, CODE 47

Judge Samuel P. Chiara

This matter is presently before the Court on Motions for Summary Judgment filed by
water right claimants the Willis A. and Wilma Hammerschmid Trust ("Hammerschmid"),
EnerVest Operating, LLC ("EnerVest"), as well as a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed
by water right claimant Michael Carlson ("Carlson"). Water Right Claimants Gary and Nancy
Motte oppose Carlson's motion and join in the motions ofEnerVest and Hammerschmid.
At issue is whether water rights 90-24, -184, -185, -186, -187, -188, -189, -190, -191 ,
-196, -197, and -299 ("Water Rights") on Minnie Maud Creek in Carbon County were properly
determined to be owned by Minnie Maud Irrigation and Reservoir Company ("Minnie Maud")
by the State Water Engineer in March of 1964.

Each of the parties included a statement of undisputed facts in support of its motion.
Additionally, some parties offered statements of additional facts in response briefs that were in
some cases the same facts offered in support of original motions. The actual facts are largely

1
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undisputed. Many of the disputes to stated facts are actually disputes regarding what inferences
may be drawn or what the legal conclusions flow from a fact. The Court finds that the following
facts are undisputed and are material to the Court's determination of this case.
l.

In about March of 1902, some users of water from Minnie Maud Creek filed Articles of
Incorporation with the State of Utah.

2. The Articles state that "[Minnie Maud] shall and does hereby purchase, take, receive and
hold all water rights now held and claimed by the several incorporators hereto, of and to
the waters of said Minnie Maud Creek in Carbon County, Utah . . ." Article XIV.
3. The Articles state that the "[Water Rights] and canals now owned by the individual
appropriators along [Minnie Maud] creek, who are incorporators hereto, ... is conveyed
by the respective owners thereof to this corporation for 2 thousand 3 hundred and 77
shares of stock .... " Article XV.
4. The Articles state, "[t]hat the said water rights and canals now owned by the individual
appropriators along said creek, who are incorporators hereto, are reasonably worth the
sum of Two Thousand Three Hundred and 77 dollars, and said property is conveyed by
the respective owners thereof to this corporation for 2 thousand 3 hundred and 77 shares
of stock at the par value thereof, issued to the owners and claimants in proportion to the
value of their rights ... " Article XV.
5. The Articles state that "[t]his corporation shall not be effective for any of the purposes
mentioned herein until at least 3000 shares of the unpaid portion of the capital stock shall
have been subscribed." Article XVI.
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6. The Articles state that only 2,377 shares of Minnie Maud stock were subscribed for and
taken by the persons identified therein, including 260 shares being issued to T.F.
Housekeeper. Article II.
7. The Articles state that "[t]he directors may sell [treasury stock] in payment of work done
and for ... the construction of reservoirs, canals, and other useful and necessary
improvements to the irrigation system of Minnie Maud Creek." Article XVI.
8. As set forth in the Articles, only 2,377 shares of stock in Minnie Maud were initially
subscribed.
9. There is no direct evidence, either documentary or testimonial, that Minnie Maud ever
subscribed or issued any shares in addition to the original 2,377.
10. On April 11, 1902, the Utah Secretary of State issued a certificate of incorporation to
Minnie Maud. The certificate reads, in part:
and that there has also been filed in my office with said certificate, a copy
of the articles of agreement; and oath or affirmation, certified by said
Clerk; that said articles contain the statement of facts required by law, and
that said corporation is hereby constituted a body corporate, with right of
succession as specified in its said articles of agreement, and is hereby
authorized to exercise all the functions, enjoy all the privileges of a
Corporation, and to transact all business of said Corporation, as specified
in its said articles of agreement.
11. By a deed dated May 12, 1902, each of the incorporators conveyed all of his/her water
rights on Minnie Maud Creek to Minnie Maud Reservoir and Irrigation Company.
12. Sometime before July 28, 1905, Minnie Maud filed an action "to determine and quiet its
right to the waters of Minnie Maud creek, ... and to enjoin [Martha Grames] from
interfering with, or from diverting or using, or asserting any rights to the use of [water
from Minnie Maud Creek]." The parties to that action were Minnie Maud and Martha
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Grames. Martha Grames prevailed in the action. The Court's decree does not purport to
determine any water rights on Minnie Maud Creek other than between the parties to suit,
namely, Grames and Minnie Maud. Grames and the Minnie Maud organizers were not
the only water users on Minnie Maud Creek at the time of suit. See, Utah State
Engineer's Water Right Index for Minnie Maud Creek, attached as Exhibit B to
Hammerschmid's Memorandum in opposition to Carlson's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
13. "Right after the company was organized, all the water users on Minnie Maud Creek went
to work with hand tools, teams and scrapers to build the reservoir up Minnie Maud
Canyon .... " Affidavit of David Anderson
14. The reservoir was completed in about 1905. It washed out between 1911 and 1913. The
reservoir stored high water from Minnie Maud Creek when it was available. On one
occasion, Ed Lee, one of the incorporators, asked David Anderson and Fred Grames to
open the headgate on the reservoir to release water to Lee for his tum. See, Affidavit of
David Anderson.
15. Anderson testified that he left the area in 1911 at the age of twenty-nine. Anderson
declared that prior to his departure he was unaware of the existence of a water master and
stated that the water users took their water from their own places of diversion. The water
was not regulated nor controlled by Minnie Maud. See, Affidavit of David Anderson.
16. Between 1902 and 1955, Minnie Maud conducted meetings and issued stock certificates.
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17. On August 1, 1962, T. A. Christensen, purporting to act as a director of Minnie Maud,
wrote a letter to the Utah State Engineer stating that Minnie Maud had subscribed a total
of only 2,377 shares of stock.
18. There is no evidence that Minnie Maud attempted to transfer or convey the Water Rights
to its shareholders or others.
19. The State Engineer issued the Proposed Determination in March, 1964, which listed
Minnie Maud as the owner of the Water Rights.
20. In the fall of 1964, Bernard Iriart, Albert Thayn, William Dause, Amber Kee, Louse
Motte, Cliver and Myrtle Mae Sprouse, and Willis A. and Wilma Hammerschid, filed
objections to the Proposed Determination. A common element of the objections is the
claim that the Proposed Determination was incorrect because it listed Minnie Maud as the
owner of the Water Rights.
21. On October 1, 1964, Clive and Myrtle Sprouse and Willis and Wilma
Hammerschmid filed an objection (the "Objection") to the Proposed
Determination.
22. The Hammershmid Objection, which was verified by Willis
Hammerschmid, provides that the Sprouses had contracted to sell the real
property identified in the Proposed Determination to the Hammerschmids,
"together with the water rights thereunto belonging including irrigation,
domestic, cullinary [sic] and stock watering belonging to the said land."
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23. The Hammershmid Objectors challenged the State Engineer's proposal
that title to the Water Rights be vested in Minnie Maud on several verified
bases, including:
a. The land, and the Water Rights applied to the land, belonged to the
Objectors, not to Minnie Maud. Objection at 2.
b. Minnie Maud was defunct and non-existent, and had been so for
many years. Objection at 2.
c. Minnie Maud failed to carry out the purpose for which it was
purported to have been organized and never distributed water to
the Objectors, to any of the stockholders or any of their
predecessors-in-interest. Objection at 2.
d. Minnie Maud failed to build or maintain dams, canals or ditches to
convey and distribute the water from Minnie Maud Creek.
Objection at 2.
e. Minnie Maud never levied assessments on or exercised jurisdiction
or control over the water from Minnie Maud Creek. Objection at 2.

f. Water under the Water Rights has been diverted by the Objectors
and their predecessors-in-interest from the natural channel by dams
and ditches belonging to them and their predecessors-in-interest,
and said water has been used by them and their
predecessors-in-interest under claim ofright upon their lands for
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irrigation and stock watering purposes without any control or
supervision by Minnie Maud since at least 1918. Objection at 2-3.
g. Legal title to the water rights represented by Claim Nos. 188, 189
and 190 has never been conveyed to Minnie Maud by the
Objectors or any of their predecessors-in-interest. Objection at 3.
h. If Minnie Maud ever acquired or otherwise had any right, title or
interest in or to the Water Rights, any such title was lost by the
adverse use of the Objectors and their predecessors-in-interest.
Since at least 1918, the Objectors and their predecessor put the
water to beneficial use which was continuous, open, notorious and
adverse to the purported rights of Minnie Maud. Objection at 3.
24. On November 9, 1974, the Utah Secretary of State issued a Certificate oflnvoluntary
Dissolution of Minnie Maud.
25. On June 28, 2000, Michael Carlson submitted a letter to the Utah Division of Water
Rights (Division), agreeing that Minnie Maud "issued 2,377 shares of stock .... "
Analysis
Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v.
Carbon County, 805 P.2d 789, 791 (Utah App. 1991); Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The facts and
evidence are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. America Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah App. 1989). Each of the parties in this case contend that the
undisputed facts are sufficient to allow the Court to rule as a matter of law.
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The issue before the Court is whether Minnie Maud existed as an entity and was capable
of owning the Water Rights in question. The owners of the Water Rights delivered a deed
purporting to convey their water rights to Minnie Maud on May 12, 1902. If Minnie Maud was a
properly formed entity, capable of acting, then it owned the Water Rights from that date until it
was divested of those rights.
EnerVest rightly points out that interests in real property cannot be conveyed to a
nonexistent entity. The rule is clearly set forth in Sharp v. Riekhof. 747 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah
1987). Quoting Rixford v. Zeigler, 150 Cal. 435, 88 P. 1092, 1093 (1907), the Utah Supreme
Court stated:
[A] deed of conveyance is void unless the grantee named is
capable of talcing and holding the property named in the deed; and
the general rule also is that to make a deed effective the grantee
must be a person, either natural or artificial, capable of taking and
holding the property.
The deed in this case names Minnie Maud Reservoir and Irrigation Company as grantee. Thus,
the first critical issue is whether Minnie Maud was a corporation, capable of taking and holding
property.
Carlson argues that Minnie Maud was a de jure corporation. A de jure corporation is one
that has been regularly created in compliance with all legal requirements and has the right to
exercise a corporate franchise that is invulnerable against attack by the state in quo warranto
proceedings. 18A Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 184. There is no undisputed fact presented by any
party that supports the position that Minnie Maud was not created in complete compliance with
the laws of the State of Utah. On April 11, 1902 the Utah Secretary of State issued a certificate
of incorporation. Pursuant to statutory authority in effect at the time, that certificate was
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evidence of de jure incorporation and was "sufficient to constitute the association of a body
corporate." See, Utah Rev. Stat. §11-1-319 (1898). Other authorities cited by Carlson support
the position that the certificate of incorporation is conclusive evidence of the de jure existence of
the corporation. See, Do/bear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1,571 (1888). This Court
concludes that the material facts surrounding the incorporation of Minnie Maud require the
Court to hold, as a matter oflaw, that Minnie was a de jure corporation no later than April 11,
1902.
This Court's holding that Minnie Maud was a de jure corporation precludes the position
that Minnie Maud was a de facto corporation. A corporation de facto exists where there has been
a good faith attempt to organize a corporation, there has been colorable compliance with
statutory requirements, and the organization has exercised corporate powers. 18A Am. Jur. 2d
Corporations § 184. De facto corporations exist where efforts to comply with statutory
incorporation requirements have fallen short. Here, Minnie Maud was in compliance with State
statute and cannot qualify as de facto because its efforts at incorporation had not failed.
The next item of inquiry is whether Minnie Maud, as a de jure corporation, had authority
to receive delivery of the Water Rights on May 12, 1902, when the deed purporting to transfer
those rights was signed by the incorporators and others who held water right interests on the
creek. Unrestrained, a corporation generally may hold legal title to real property. However,
incorporators may limit the authority of a corporation to act through the corporation's articles of
incorporation and bylaws which act as a contract between the members and the corporation. "It
is well established precedent that the bylaws of a corporation, together with the articles of
incorporation, the statute under which it was incorporated, and the member's application,
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constitute a contract between the member and the corporation." Okelberry v. W Daniels Land

Ass'n, 120 P.3d 34, 39 (Utah Ct. App. 2005)(citation omitted). The articles and bylaws also form
a contract among the members themselves. See, id. (citation omitted). Further, a corporation
"may not act in any way not authorized in its ... articles of incorporation or bylaws." Id.
(citation omitted). Thus, should incorporators decide among themselves to create a corporation
that cannot hold title to real property, they may contract to do so and embody that contract in the
articles and bylaws of the corporation. Additionally, corporations may exist and have temporary
limitation imposed upon the corporation's authority to operate.

See, Murphy v. Crosland, 886

P.2d 74, 83 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) .aff4., 915 P.2d 491 (Utah 1996).
The certificate of incorporation issued to Minnie Maud expressly states that, "[Minnie
Maud] is hereby authorized to exercise all the functions, enjoy all the privileges of a
Corporation, and to transact all business of said Corporation, as specified in its said articles of

agreement." (emphasis added). Minnie Maud's articles state, in pertinent part, "[t]his
corporation shall not be effective for any of the purposes mentioned herein until at least 3000
shares of the unpaid portion of the capital stock shall have been subscribed." Article XVI. "In
the interpretation of a contract, the parties' intentions are controlling. If the contract is in writing
and its language is not ambiguous, the parties' intentions should be determined from the words
of the agreement." Turner v. Hi-Country Homeowners Ass'n, 910 P.2d 1223, 1225-26 (Utah
1996)(citation omitted). Here, the language of the parties' written contract is not ambiguous.
Minnie Maud was given authority by the certificate of incorporation to transact business as
specified in its articles. The unambiguous language of the articles states that Minnie Maud has
no authority to act until 3,000 shares of capital stock have been subscribed. Thus, Minnie Maud,
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although a de jure corporation, was limited in its ability to act until 3,000 shares were subscribed.
Until such time, Minnie Maud had no authority pursuant to the agreement of its own members to
hold title to any property.
It is an undisputed fact that only 2,377 shares of stock in Minnie Maud were initially
subscribed. It is also undisputed that there is no direct documentary or testimonial evidence that
any additional shares were ever subscribed. As late as 1962, one person who apparently believed
in the corporate existence of Minnie Maud, and purporting to act as a director, wrote a letter to
the Utah State Engineer stating that Minnie Maud had subscribed a total of only 2,377 shares of
stock. Further, Carlson himself, in June, 2000, submitted a letter to the Utah Division of Water
Rights (Division), agreeing that Minnie Maud "issued 2,377 shares of stock .... " Now Carlson
appears to challenge the fact that only 2,377 shares were subscribed in his response to
EnerVest's statement of undisputed fact number 13. Carlson states, "[b]ased on additional
research into the records and history of Minnie Maud, there is a reasonable inference that either
additional shares were issued to meet the 3000-share threshold or that the requirement was
waived." Combined Reply in Support of Carlson's Motion for Summary Judgment in Favor of
the Proposed Determination at xvii. Carlson points out that Minnie Maud's articles of
incorporation allow its directors to issue stock in payment for construction of reservoirs and that
the waters users on Minnie Maud Creek went to work building a reservoir on the creek between
1902 and 1905. Apparently, as additional support for the inference, Carlson points to the
circumstantial evidence that Minnie Maud held meetings, kept minutes, levied assessments, and
pursued litigation. Although Carlson seemingly challenges the fact the no more than 3,000
shares were subscribed in the "Consolidated Statements of Fact, Responses, and Replies" section
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of his memorandum, Carlson does nothing to develop or advance his position in the "Argument"
section. In the "Argument" section, Carlson is silent on both the law and its application
regarding inferences used to defeat undisputed statements of fact. Carlson's memorandum fails
to provide the Court with any legal authority or argument regarding factual inferences and
wholly abandons what appears to be an earlier request that the Court infer that 3,000 shares were
subscribed. Instead, Carlson's argument focuses only on the aspect of waiver of the 3,000 share
condition. See, id. at 5.
This Court declines to draw the inference that Carlson seeks. Carlson is only entitled to
reasonable inferences drawn from undisputed facts. See, USA Power v. PacificCorp, 236 P.3d
749, 757 (Utah 2010). The Court cannot resort to mere speculation. See, Harding v. Atlas Title
Ins. Agency, Inc., 285 P.3d 1260, 1262 (Utah Ct. App. 2012). Carlson has not provided the
Court with any legal argument or analysis to support a position that the Court should infer that
perhaps 3,000 shares were subscribed. Courts are not required to consider matters that are not
adequately argued. See, eg., Am. Fork City v. Hulet, 293 P.3d 378, 379-80 (Utah 2012) (An
issue is inadequately briefed "when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the
burden of research and argument to the reviewing court.")(citation omitted).
Because the Court declines to infer that 3,000 shares were subscribed, Minnie Maud
acted ultra vires when it accepted delivery of the deed of the Water Rights in May of 1902.
Because a conveyance is void unless the grantee named is capable of taking and holding the
property named in the deed, the purported conveyance of the Water Rights here would have been
void. See, Sharp v. Riekhof, 747 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1987). Such conclusion and result are
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inevitable unless the undisputed facts also support the legal determination that the incorporators
and shareholders of Minnie Maud waived the 3,000 share condition.
"A party to a contract, who is entitled to demand performance of a condition precedent,
may waive the same, either expressly or by acts evidencing such intention; and perfonnance of a
condition precedent to taking effect of the contract may be waived by the acts of the parties in
treating the agreement as in effect." Becker v. HSA/Wexford Bancgroup, L.L.C., 157 F. Supp. 2d
1243, 1251-52 (D. Utah 200l)(quoting Ahrendt v. Bobbitt, 229 P.2d 296,297 (Utah 1951).
Minnie Maud was a dejure corporation in May 1902. The only thing preventing it from
holding title to the Water Rights was the contractual condition precedent, evidenced by the
corporate articles, that required that 3,000 shares be subscribed before the corporation had
authority to act. That contractual covenant was binding upon the shareholders and upon the
corporation but was also capable of modification and subject to waiver. At the time the
incorporators and shareholders executed the deed on May 12, 1902, they were presumably aware
of the condition precedent. The articles of incorporation were newly minted and the certificate
of incorporation was only a month old. They were a small group and the articles of
incorporation identified the nine incorporators and the number of shares held by each. And yet,
aware that only 2,377 shares had been subscribed, or at least unconcerned about requiring proof
that the condition had been met, each of the incorporators and other water interest holders
transferred his and her Water Rights to the corporation. As beneficiaries of the contractual
agreement, every one of the stockholders was entitled to demand performance of the condition
precedent. Any of the shareholders and any of the directors might have demanded that Minnie
Maud not hold title to the Water Rights until the required number shares were subscribed. But
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instead, each of them acted overtly, evidenced their intention to waive the condition precedent,
and treated the corporation as being in effect by deeding real property interests to the
corporation. The Court finds that the shareholders' act of executing and delivering a deed of the
Water Rights to Minnie Maud demonstrates the shareholders' clear intention of waiving
performance of a condition precedent and treating the agreement as in effect. See, Ahrendt v.
Bobbitt, 229 P.2d 296,297 (Utah 1951). The otherwise ultra vires act of Minnie Maud was

thereby ratified by the each of the shareholders, incorporators, directors, and Water Rights
owners.
The other purported corporate acts by Minnie Maud and its shareholders are not of great
import in this ruling. Whether Minnie Maud was authorized to levy assessments or pursue
litigation isn't at issue. Only Minnie Maud's capacity to own and hold the Water Rights is being
litigated. And for at least that purpose, each of the shareholders and the corporation itself waived
the condition precedent and treated the agreement as in effect. Minnie Maud, thus, being a de
jure corporation in the eyes of the State, and each of the shareholders having waived the
condition precedent with regard to the corporation's authority and capacity to possess real
property, became the legal owner of the Water Rights on May 12, 1902.
Hammershmid opposes Carlson's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Proposed
Determination arguing that if Minnie Maud was legal owner of the water rights in 1902,
Hammershmid acquired title to its water rights prior to 1939 through adverse possession. This
same claim was made by the Hammershmid predecessors in their challenge to the Proposed
Determination in October of 1964.
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In Utah, prior to 1939, a party could acquire title to water by adverse possession. See,
Otter Creek Reservoir Co. v. New Escalante Irrigation Co., 203 P.3d 1015, 1018-19 (Utah

2009). A claimant obtains adverse title to water rights when the claimant exercises continuous,
uninterrupted, hostile, notorious, adverse enjoyment under a claim of title with the knowledge
and acquiescence of the person having the prior right. See, Wellsville E. Field Irr. Co. v. Lindsay
Land & Livestock Co., 137 P.2d 634,641 (1943). In order to successfully oppose Carlson's

Summary Judgment, Hammershmid must propound undisputed material facts that support the
elements of adverse possession. In its support, Hammershmid provided a Statement of
Additional Facts. Of those purported facts, only the following have any bearing on the issue of
adverse possession and relate in any way to the period prior to 1939.
4. On October I, 1964, Clive and Myrtle Sprouse and Willis and
Wilma Hamrnerschmid filed an objection (the "Objection") to the
Proposed Determination. A copy of the Objection is attached
hereto as Exhibit H.
5. The Objection, which was verified by Willis Hamrnerschmid,
provides that the Sprouses had contracted to sell the real property
identified in the Proposed Determination to the Hammerschmids,
"together with the water rights thereunto belonging including
irrigation, domestic, cullinary [sic] and stock watering belonging to
the said land." Objection at 1.
6. The Objectors challenged the State Engineer's proposal that title
to the Water Rights be vested in Minnie Maud on several verified
bases, including:
a. The land, and the Water Rights applied to the land, belonged to
the Objectors, not to Minnie Maud. Objection at 2.
b. Minnie Maud was defunct and non-existent, and had been so for
many years. Objection at 2.
c. Minnie Maud failed to carry out the purpose for which it was
purported to have been organized and never distributed water to
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the Objectors, to any of the stockholders or any of their
predecessors-in-interest. Objection at 2.
d. Minnie Maud failed to build or maintain dams, canals or ditches
to convey and distribute the water from Minnie Maud Creek.
Objection at 2.
e. Minnie Maud never levied assessments on or exercised
jurisdiction or control over the water from Minnie Maud Creek.
Objection at 2.
f. Water under the Water Rights has been diverted by the Objectors
and their predecessors-in-interest from the natural channel by dams
and ditches belonging to them and their predecessors-in-interest,
and said water has been used by them and their
predecessors-in-interest under claim of right upon their lands for
irrigation and stock watering purposes without any control or
supervision by Minnie Maud since at least 1918. Objection at 2-3.
g. Legal title to the water rights represented by Claim Nos. 188,
189 and 190 has never been conveyed to Minnie Maud by the
Objectors or any of their predecessors-in-interest. Objection at 3.
h. If Minnie Maud ever acquired or otherwise had any right, title or
interest in or to the Water Rights, any such title was lost by the
adverse use of the Objectors and their predecessors-in-interest.
Since at least 1918, the Objectors and their predecessor put the
water to beneficial use which was continuous, open, notorious and
adverse to the purported rights of Minnie Maud. Objection at 3.

The foregoing is of little use in determining whether Hammershmid's predecessors in
interest possessed the Water Rights by adverse possession. First, the Objection referred to above
was verified only by Willis Hammerscmid (not Sprouse) and it fails to affirm that the statements
are based upon Willis Hammershmid's personal knowledge. See, U.R.C.P. 56(c)(4), (stating,
"An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal
knowledge, must set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and must show that the
affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated."). The statement also contains
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no details upon which the Court can infer that the statements were based on Willis
Hammershmid's personal knowledge. See, id. For example, the statement does not set forth
when Willis Hammershmid took possession of the property. Thus, the Court cannot determine
from the statement whether Willis Hammershmid had any personal knowledge of the use of the
water from Minnie Maud Creek prior to 1939 and during the relevant period. Second,
paragraphs 6 a, b, g and h are not statements of fact but are legal conclusions.

Third,

paragraphs 6 c, and d, if true, are not relevant to Hammershmid's adverse possession claim.
Thus, the only material portions of the quoted material is contained in paragraphs 6 e and f and
state that Willis Hammershmid's predecessors in interest used the Water Rights without any
control or supervision of Minnie Maud since 1918.
Even assuming, which this Court does not, that Willis Hammershmid had personal
knowledge of the purported use of the Water Rights between 1918 and 1939, the claimed fact
does not support the legal conclusion that the use was hostile and adverse to Minnie Maud.
Hammershmid's successors in interest owned shares in Minnie Maud and were thus entitled to
use their aliquot share of water from the creek. There are no facts that have been propounded in
these various motions that supports the idea that Hammershmid's predecessors took more water
between 1918 and 1939 than to which they would have been entitled by their ownership of
Minnie Maud stock. Mere use of water to which they were clearly entitled would have been
insufficient to put Minnie Maud on notice that Hammersmid's predecessors were asserting an
adverse claim to the water. See, Otwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 588 (Utah 1982); see also,
Mathews v. Baker, 155 P. 427,428 (Utah 1916).
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The Court concludes that Hammershmid has failed to support its claim of adverse
possession.
Minnie Maud continued its de jure existence until November 9, 1974. There is no
evidence it ever divested itself of the Water Rights. Thus, the Court concludes that the State
Water Engineer correctly determined that the Water Rights were owned by Minnie Maud in
March of 1964.
Carlson's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. The Motions of Hamrnershmid and
EnerVest are denied. r-~
DATED this~ day of January, 2016.

District Court Judge
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Addendum 2
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T'nis agreement made and entered into this 27th day oi' l~ch,

,

.

.

1902 by and between the parties whose names are hereunto subscribed, WITNESSETR:
TRA.T WRE:REAS, the undersign1:d bei~ ~esirous of associating themselves together

f'or the l)ur:po_s e· of cons_tructing, purchasing and oynil:lg water reservoirs, ditches,
and canals , and other means of controlling and distributing waters for irrigation
and domestic_~~? and for the :pur_pose ·of appropri ating, purchasillg, omrlDg =d
,

..

:-:
I

~/.:.
:-:·

~tributing water for ·irrigation and .domestic use 'to the stockholders iIJ. this
corporati on, and of fo=ing a corporation for that purpose;

Now,~, the

undersigned a majority of us being reside~ts of the ~ta.te of Utah, pursuant to
the laws of the State oi' Utah do hereby certi:ry, declaxe, arid agree as follows:

. 1.
This corporation called and known by the name of the Minnie 1-f.atld
Reservoir and Irrigation Comp"'....ny, and. it sbalJ. be and is form~d and organized
at Minnie Maud Precinct, Ca:rbon County, State o:f Utah.
11,

The names of ~he incorporators hereo~, their residences, and the
amount of stock sullscribed. and taken

by each, are as follows: to-wit:

RESIDENCES
Eorper

NO.SBA.'l'lES PAR VAIDE
,$l. OO each

1202

II

Johnston & Son

11

E, And.erson

"

39

II

.r.

II

68

II

A. Hamilton

(not named)

WiJJ.i= Hamilton

II

T , F , Housekeeper

II

260

II

A. 0, Smith

II

14-3

II

Alonzo Kelger

II

182

n

Da.v::i,d 'Russell

• II

227

II

lll.

'Th.e.t the corporation herein prov:i.ded. for, and hereby created, shall
exist and continue for the te-"'111 of one hundred, y~a.i:s, unless sooner dissolved.
and. disincorporated according to

law.
000802

' ...

.•

,.....,.,,

-2-

lV,
That the objects, busine·ss and :pursu:1ts of this .corp:,ration shall
be to c~nstruct, purchase, a.nd own, reservoirs, ditches and canals in Ca:cbon
County, Utah, and to :purchase, ap:propriate and receive and own waters and
water rights and to distribute to its seve:ral ~tockholders waters owned by it,
according to their respectiYe boJ.d.ings oi' capital stock in said company, and
especia~ to purchase, rec.eive and own the canals, ·waters,

ana. water

rights

nmr owned by the severa.'1 residents and. app:rppriators of water on and along
Min..:.ie Maud Creek in Nine M:i.le Canyon, Carbon County, Ut?,h and i t is intended

thE.t this corporation shall succeed to the property rights of said residents
and appropriators , in the waters and ditches a.'rid canals of said Mipnie Maud
Creek.'

v.
The general office of this corporation sha'.)...l be at 1'!.innie Maud
Precinct, Carbon County, Utab., where shall ~o be this corporation's place . ,
of general business.

vi.
The amount of the capital stock of this corporation shall be
Eight Thousand Dollars divided. into Eight '.I:housand sha:res 9f' the par .value of

$1. 00 each .

vn.
:fue officers o:!.' this cor:poration shall be a Board o.f Five Directors.,
a president, a vice-president, a secretary and' a treasurer.

The President, and ·

Vice Pres.i d.ent shall be chosen by the ]3oa:rd of Directors from al!!D~ their
number, and said Board. shall also choose the treasurer a.i:ia. secretary :f'rom the
stockhold.ers of this cor:po:ration.

No per·s on shall be deemed. quali.fied. to hold

office :i.~ this corporation who is not a .sto~kholder therein.
V1JJ..

The i'ollow-i_ng named persons shall be officers of this corp::>ration
until the first annual mee.t ing herein1l,fter provided for and until their
successors are elected and qualified to-tit:

E. Anderson, Director a.:ad President
G. C.
E. c.
James
0, A:

Johnston, Director and. Vice President
'Lee, Director and. Secretary
Ramilton, Director and Treasu..>-er
Smith 1 Director
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/lIJy vacancy caused in any office herein ~rovided for by resignation,· death,

or~ remova.1 , shall be. f.illecl by :t;he Boa.rd ,of .Directors, until the· next gene:raJ.

,1,._;- ~,-

meeting of the stockholders,

A majority of the Boa:rd of' Di.1"ectors shall con-

stitute a quorum for the transaction of the business of this corporation.
]X.

:f

~.

. The term of office of "the officers oi' this corporation sball be

...,.

}; <~

.!j;

{-~

1 ~

:, •

~.t ·.;:f.··

''!j'

f · :~Jfr:

for one year and until their successors are du~ elected and qualified, unless they sooner resign or are removed.

;: , f.~--~·

~~-

~

f:
·/
j'; •

·! l-,

x.
Tb.ere sbalJ. be an allD.ual stockholders' meeting for the election oi'

E-.,~
,!rr

officers and for the t~nsaction of· such other bus:illess as shall lawfully

~.,'

Me.rch 1 of each and every year, at ten o'clock A,M. at the general office of

!:•

.. ' .,

·.. ·?.
t.

t

~

come before -it, which shall. be held on the f'i.1"st Monday of' the month of

this corporation, at Minnie lf.caud Precinct, Carbon County, Utah.

A repre-

sentation of' the =jority of the stock owned by the several stockholders
here:f sha ll be necessary to hold said n:eeting and , transact business, but
less than a. majority of stock may a<l:journ such meeting from t:i:me to time
until such ma jority of rep:resentation may be obtained.

The officers of this

corporation except such as sball be chos en by the :Boa:rd of Di:rectors, sball
be elected e.t the annual meetings.

SUch election sball be by ballctJ anci. ·

the person receiv-,...ng a majority of votes of the stockholders at such meetil:lg
shall be held and c'Ecl.E.red to be elected to said offices respectively; a nd
each stockholder shall be entitled to a s many votes as he holds sha res of
said Capital stock; and represe11tat i on by proxy duly apr.ointed in w.ri ting shall ·
be allowed at all stockho~uers' meetings·whether general or special.
The first meeting of the corporatio~ for the election of officers
and other pur:poses as herein provided, sha ll be held on the first Monday of
the rccnth of MarchJ 1902 a t the houx and. :9lace above stated :for the general

,.
l

1.

annuel'meetings of stockholders ,

A failure to hold any annual or specia l

stockholders 1 meeting at the time ·:provided for in this agreement shall not_
forfeit nor in any manner interefere with the corporate rights acquired under

i
'

this agreement; and a.ny such meeting may be held at any subsequent time) upon
giving the notice required by law.

000804

4S!)ecial meetings of the stockholders of this corporation shall be
called by the· Board of Di.rectors .

The Secreta...ry ·shall, or on his failu:re so

to do any officer. of :this corporation may, give notice of annual and special
stockholders' meetings,

Xl.
The Boaxd of Directors shall. have power to appoint all necessary
agents, watennasters~ and officers ne·ceesary to carry on its business, and.
s:b.all make such rules~ reg.tJ..ations and. by-laws as are · nec~ssa:ry and proper
to manage, control and o:i;e rate its business and pro:9erty, and slE.ll c_a r:ry
into effect the objects of the corporation.

Such by-laws, :ru.J.es and_regula-

tions shall be maci.e by the boBJ;"d of di.rectors, and shall exist subject to the
alJ1)rOval Of the StOCkhOlderS I at their SUCCeedi.ng a:muaJ. meeting,
The Boa."'ti of Directors are hereby. aui;:horized. and Sll\POWered to levy
and collect assessments upon the capital stock of this corporation for tbe
purpose of carrying on its business as herein agreed upon, and to that extent

and for -that purpose the. capital stoc.'t hereof is lll3.de assessable.

Such

assessments shall be levied and. collected. in the manner !)rovided by law • .
Xlll.
The }?.rivate property or the stockholders of° the corporation shall
not be liable for tbe debts or llabi.lities of the corporation.
XJ.V,

This corporation shall and does hereby purchase , take, receive and.
hold all the water rights nm, held =d claimed by the ~evaral incorporators
hereto, oi' and. to the waters of said Mi=ie Maud Creek in Carbon County, Utah,
together Vi.th ail canals, <J.Bl!IS, locks·, gat_es and weirs used. therewith th:roughout the whole system of ~aid Minnie Maud Irrigation ditches, and the same being
the ~tches , canals , ~eadgates and rights now owned and claime d by the individ.ua.l
~

incorporators hereto,

.· .

It is intend.ea. by this agree=t to incor:porij!-te all the :waters of
.
.
.
. .
Minnie Ms.ud Creek and. its tr:i.butaries except~ Con Canyon ( ) i'rOlll. "its
\•

source to Harper :Post Office, commonly called Lee's R~ch, a distance of
about 30 miles ; to huild a wl construct reservoirs near th<: h ead of said. lf.dlmie
Maud Creek, and to regulate the distribution of the waters of said creeJ'. and
:from said reservoirs throughout the entire system covered. by this agreement.

000805
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xv.
Tb.at the se.id wate:?:". rights and cana;i.s now O'n"lled by the individual
ap]?ropriators along said creek, who are incorporators hereto, ,a re ree.sone.bly
worth :the sum of Two Th9usa.nd Three Rundred and. 77 dollars, and said 'property
is conveyed by the respective oWDers thereof to this corporation for 2
thousand

3 hundred and. TI she.res oi' stock at" the· par value thereof, issued to

the owners and claimants in proIJortion to the value of their rights, and. in
full payment therefor, and said 2 thousand.
,.

i,

3 hundred ·ana. TI shares of stoc.1';

are hereby declare'd to be fully paid up capital stock.

xvi.
This corj;Jore.tio~ sb2.ll not be effective for e.ny of the purposes
mentioned herein until at least 3000 shares of the unpaid. portion of the
capital stock shall have been subscribed.

Toe unstibscri"oed. capital stoc.lc

shall be and is hereby ne.de the property of the corporation.

Ta.e directors

may sell ·the same from time to tiroe and may issue the same i .n payment of
work done and for the purc:base of water rights and improvements and for the
construction of' reservoirs; canals, and. other useful and nec_essary :i.mprovements to the irrigation system of Minnie Maud Cree..'!<.

And. alJ.. persons holding

stock under this agreement, shall have the water distributed to them in the
proportion of their holdi~gs of said stock; and all the shares of stock of
this corporation," when once issued, shall stand. upon and eq_ual footi.Dg.
IU WITNESS THEREOF, the parties to these presents have. hereunto

set their hands and. seals this 27th day of March," l902.
E. C. Lee
E. Anderson
J. A. Hamilton
(}. c. Johnston

A, O. Smitb.

Alonzo Alger
STATE OF UTJ\.R

)

COUNTY OF CARBON

)
)

E.. C. Lee,

ss.

E. Anderson, and J. A. Hamilton, being first d ~

S',rorn, each :for him.sell, says: that he is one of the incorporators of the

Incorporation mentioned .in the foregoing ag:reement; that he and his
co:j.ncorporators mentioned herein ha.ve commence, and it is bona fide their
intention to continue the business mentioned ·in the foregoing artickes of
Agreement, and that each pa.rty to the agreement has :£aid at least ten

l)"'...r

000806
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:·

-6cent of the stock subscribed by him, and tha.t more than ten per ,cent of the
capital stock of the cor:9oration bas been paid into. said corporation; end

'·.·

aff:iants verily believe that each. :party to the agreement has paid or· :i,S
able to 'faY and will 'faY tJJ.e amount of' the stock subscribed for by him.

E. C. Lee
E. ./1.nderson
J. A. Ram.:i.lton
Subscribed a¢ sworn ~o before me this 27th day of March, 1902

s.

~.

·,.

)
)
COONTY OF CA.."IIBON )

C. Johansen, Justice of tbe Peace

ss

I, ff, R! Donaldson, Cou!!:i;y. Cler}~ in and for the County of Carbon,

,.

i:

~:
\•
~
,-:,

,ic
...

.s,·
\ ..'
r.,

~.:

State of Utah, do h~rei:>y certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct
copy of the Articles of .Agreement and oath or affirmation of the Miililie Maud
Reservoir and Irr~gation Company and I fur:t,qer certify ~at the said

t

corporation has duly filed in my office the P..greement of Incocyoration,

(

toget_h er with tbe oath or affirmation oi' tbe incocyorators and oath of

(:,·

~

:·

'·
.·.

office of each officer, as required by C'n apte r 1 of Title ll, Revised
Statutes of Utah, as amended by Chapter 81 of· the laws of Utah 1901.

!.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my band and affixed· rcy:_
official seal this 5th day of April 1902.

w.

,.

H. DONALDSON,

com~

CLERK

(SEAL)
Filed and certificate issued this llth

day

o f April 1902.

J. T. HAMMOND, SE~.:RY OF STATE

000807

Addendum 3

f

STATE OF UTAH
)
COUNTY OF CARSON SS.

I heroby certify that lhe dpoument to
wh11ch th is certificate Is attached Is a
ful , true. end correct PODY of the
or gin el !Ilea and now In my custo !l,y .
~ 01T~t~f,Y han d and see1 2t8i~:fil'TH

81rrJ1~~t°
Y-"«2'°4NJ~:R
w hDER1By

Recorder/Deputy

001279

Addendum 4
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J.,1 ..•. '..:1.;c::o =..:: t:-.!:on -;.:._: !!",!l od.!l l"!!l•.!, :"!.id :.:~1.~ --r,1ld b<n?·o
j!"o.:•.t.:.:· la~3 in vllluo1 ::i1::.~ tho c.ro;,s r.ai11cd if,c~eo:1 -:r:l·.!l:t' b .i.11
li:.:cljh.ooll. ':iot ma.turt, u11l!Wo t'hcr., "j'Crc itt!;atod a...14 "t~o;o:,~17t,:lvo l!ttb oi- .:io · Vtlluo,i ~b."l!i. tho soil ot 3!lid. l:i.:1:b, 1a hwO'Tor,
1'o~tile 1 ··ttncl Wh!)Q G~ia,' l:i:itio lll'O 1:wi:;ntc~ .. Otb.Cr.1180 tb,_on 'b)'.
n:itu.r~l raintdl, ';hey a::o V0'1!7 praduot~vo .a.n:l e.ro :::,:ea~~:7 on-

hznc<id :I.Ji ,rnlu.e, .
... .
. '.
'·
ll, 'l!bat !:he ·!il~t U.t' ho;,ein I ud

.

,:1., 1,rodGoobao:rs· 1A

i;i,tore3t hayo,' r.;r·nol'e hh!m Zeveut;t (70) 700::c iuat ;.e.c~, -~-.
riGat"ed the land.1 ~i!roiWl.bove de:ao.rib.~ and iu div.er:Oin5 !or b.t
~W:!,)0Se, 011 thG plnintitf'q l.nnd, all tho VtitOr l!.8CEl:J:Jnr.1 for .
such ~i3Ution '!roD G:d! !.!iDnie J~ue_ ~reek, .
.12, ~..e,t !or GOVO::oJ. :'CL""& ~!.o.r. to the C~::!ea.c·eiz:'3?1t Of
this il.ct:lo:11; tho derend(l!lts, 'l!,· P. '!I:>~ekeo!ler, Bud Jlirhtensen,
'..!hem.as Obrlstonsen, aua I .A:be:: ~eel.. h:t.vc diverl.ed ~,.;e q~t:iea
,
.
. ot,w11tc above th!l. .la.nd'of 1:he :;,laintii':t, heroina'bovo deaoribed,
. 11nci ,oa~h ot ~he.i, :tor more than 'his ,:lust cu;>.d due proportion 'there0
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if

)lSeJ. a:i.d 01' ,his jjuat ppoportion C?f' so.id w:ito1:' to t~o s:rea1. d~gel
(
encl ,iaj~ of the "plaintiff and t~ca.tened to contizme to d.o ~o, · : : ·
• • • • • ., ,.
I
t
•
'
·for wb.ich·s~ 1i!Jl117 ~lcdntii'.t hos . no adel1Wlto·%'emeq at .la~.·
. : •••.·
·. ..:.13. 'J!hnt the'.~aid
de.tealante, 'l.
li'.;Bouseteepez,;·,hd
..
•
•
•
..
• • •
••
..
._,
'I
. , :obristansen, 'J!hocies 'O bristeasen and .\mber'Xeel, £or the pa.st s'eve,rn.l . . \.
. ~ . ..,. . ,~ . ' . ..
, .
.
.
.
. )
' . · .:res.re:, divertiea: anll oo.n-~ea. a large amount of w:ber ~-Jaid
.. . •, . ;.• · ·.~
I
•
f
· ·• •Mimiie Jlaud 'Creek and. fi'OJ:I its ?r.:.tc)r Shed 1 to nevJ.y bro!tet:1. and. •
..
. ,'cultivuted ~ ~ are no·., ~o di.vertiD5 iod c ~ awa;r 'so.id, • .
=.Ja\e~'
'tro:m -so.id
-~o·· : · ·. ,
,; .. .' . .
. ·sLm!e
. t:aud Creek
. to the ,gre.s.t loss and .iajDZ7
.
•, : .
,. ·the' ..plaia.ti.tt and. t:roate.i.ed. to oon!:;inue to do u~.
· :·
· · 14.
·tho· TIB.ters· o~ · sa.ia Bff~~ ue' ot n 41.:terent'.
' .\· ·volu:e"in o.o;sordance·w:i.th
the
ilf.tueu.t·
se:isona in tho year1 'that
•
• •
•
• •
••
•
•
• •
"'I'
the:.-o
is
auttioient
na.ter'in
said
ore~:t'o
1.rrigatfe
all the
. . . . . . ,.
. .
..
.
. ori:;1- .
•'WU:~ t~t' ,'rJas-~d.~ c'!1ti.vatt?,
-~µie,"tl!at','-tbo ~ e · . .
'

-

i
}

ff ..
J
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. :
• A

'b;r, ailusins fih~ d;i¢nu~_io'u Of cile' Btra~ 0~ e.lid ~t~:t' Of'. ~ 8 . . l , .
liauit' Oreek, so .tlo~ to tte s:lid :;il:lint11'i''s lwid. to the extecif
:;
·. ·t:imt ~itl:le '1:i: ~ W!l.to1" reao~es the lrl'n4? of· the :plid.nt~ ' a:14· : '
:
· dexri~. it of the ne~~~se.r,y \;a.Ver .for hriu&,tion and d0.l!lest1o · ... · J
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~~1-! ::..•e.~::
:'O!"J:.!.a.~qJ. b;; ·.!io :::i~!',~c:,: ,r~ l.i
'!. :.;~~·.;~ ,! ~·~, . ~~ic.1 1!1 tl.i·J ~o~i::,:a, :-- .l eat c;::.o ~!. ..o ~1:::t, :::.c
~~.:.~asa!:1 oa;po~.1bl;,:: ::::.~ o:- ~"li~w, !~ ~o(!. i:i ~ ~-oa.:.,o:mblo,
~o-, :u::!.,~l -:-:i,t .'Jo:icr~oi:ll '3:-.;,·, : ro·l.i~lad ~,10 i)..,..o or i!ivi::J~!ln enil
c.i:,t:-!.bullion :t s:u.l ,1ote:- 1o had, o.nd t!\~t t~a. pl:i!cti!.f" t.(n.'ein,
'b~ · ~l:o a-iid aol:o of: llhi, d~i'en:bn~s ,· :.l:\:l o:'lc!l o:!:' i;~u,cT t\S 11!0:c::; 0:tid., ~ de;,riv.-i.~ of i1i3,• ju.st Md. Cl1U1 tllble :sh-,.::o
ot :;:iid m;.c:o:-~·;
.
. ~rul, t:i!at ~:10 ~u:Jt :mcl o:uit:i':>lo e:i:u-o ot o-:iid ~tbo: ~or s:dd l,:1.1\1
ot .ylaic.ti:Ci' is, 31:;:li:r' (60;~) :,c:- oen~ , ot ~!:o •N:i';;c:- i:i ::ix!e or in
.. vol~e ao n0':7i,:1;: 1:1. s:iid c=ocl:. , :
.
·
15. "ihat the d~.femlnQ,t:c· b.orein, ~. '1. I~~C::eeplll:'9 •3ud.
9~!stcmse':1, 'llloc:ta Jliristense:i, 11:ld Aci?er ;:eel, 11:1.ve wil!\l:!:11', ·
i
i:::ioui;l;l;y, t::'OD.::;.tull,1, ua.liciously antl unla..-tul.1:, '1verted i:na.
•
~~· rll!u.12-f, !..--;io·.:ill.1~, ~ons;i'Ull;r, ~lio!ou.:ly end u : i l . ~ :
dimtb.:;, o.nd Wlleu e:jo!u~d 'lT.i orde~ .;,f ~bis ho~orab1e court
~ill co:?1tinu!3 to ;-;Jilfull;r, knw~, ~·J;Lgi.~, w,.J.1ci9'1,Sl;r :•
~
• and unle.~ d1~ort a..U or alnoat' a1l eho 'Ir.I.ten 0~ o:1id ,~ b . 1·.:·
.~ud Or~'.4 1 :;.t ~oint~ u'bovo :;j\3 'l.!mll!& OJ: tllo l)lainti!i' hero~.
,above rBrtj,cularli de3cribed, ~~e°b)" 'Tfbolly depri~~ the plaint,·.
• 1 11'£
:us. just. OJ!4 e~it:iblo sbaro of ';!le 'Jatera of s"?.14 ,area:.:..
•{
' ·
'..~:lilf :plain.iii.ff )T'QJ'SI
' : •
'
•
I
1. T!!at tho Court ASoerta.i:l l;b.e mount oE nntcr :belo??,...~
· ~
ills l;o' each o! .bt~ ,artieo l;e.."'13~ tro~ said ~ e i.?aud bel:.
;
· 2. '?bnt _ao.o!: o! 'the. <le tend.ante he.rou, and theu- l"eSfeo~ ·
· -J;'ive a;sent:s, attor:10jS, e~loyees, s,e...""VtUlts, tlt~ts, GUocesaori: :
•• or
·11.Ssio-:is be, :.,e1'!)et~
e~oi.'l&i irc;ic di.Te~t~ out~ thoir
· • • •··; . t•,
• •
•
!.
re~eotive lauds aey ::iore wator tb.:m that al);t-o!"t:ionod to thee,
·
· ·au.a.be per:i,etu~ ·e~oitied .frora in ~ tncy'. int~foriAJ vi.1ib:the ..
,: ·balazico ~t the ua:r· of sai~ at:::.-enn to .t~e la.:11is 01: tbo plaintllf. · . ;'
1
herein.
3. Fo'r suob ·o:;her e.n.d turt~er relief 83 to
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Addendum 5

OCT 1 0 1957
8 .. H. YOUNG, CL!aRK

.

~-~m,.'..~
~ u'fY/ /

av ..

Oross-Pla~ntif!,
JR., and ·

)
)
)

COB

-De£endantso)

Civil Noo 7845

EV00307

000928

-.!?l:~i~~2fi·),i ·: ~, '. ;~~ii,..~~./''... :((:;/\-t::~1--1,~

~~;n.~=-~J.
'lii . . ·e'fflf has
~i~~-f~t· *~
,~,~~

,. )

:a:~~

· .,· fd1i\ 't)hd'.J1tif:( to Ue'e~:~lla:ter

t~~

i1t,r..'

oeen any gre·a t expenditure

~~~

fJ
'ii/

·;ii11:1·f~allegationa of paragraph 9..

,. .•',·"' !,,\'l:sc{ll~s of parag,aph 10, exeapt that thi!..

t1

f~,.{>p::iiatf £rr:Lf!;ti:l;ion. of plaintiff• s lands is beneficial..

~~? _
~;~fi5f:?::~ ~

·~·

al.:J.egations

~e'.s;_Jlie

i(

~

Al.leges the fact

o.f :paragraph lL,

JjJi)~;a~cessors in interest of the plainti.f.f made a

Jr::

. ·...

~- ·.:;f·;~~Jo ~ 1~· ~"'--

..

if~Jt~{:1atio.n prior to 190;S o.r some of the waters of

'ci:;J!r~·ek

{

t

with a point of. diversion a considerable distance

~JfC~::

~

Jifi'.;~~e point of diversion which the plaintif'.£ is
n,"ij.i31i.ve·r ing to use.
'.r':F.,,~;ft"·. i+

-~··.
·

t'.~·;!i$.~1tf=~tf/1v.ersion
f;tz.litio1:i:~ihe.re

:.1!!:~~~rt:~'.o/..:ilf. g ·. r

is

f

or~~~';':~lly estabiished by a diligence

N

ana

·~

t

seeps'

and othe:i:-

sources

of inflow

MJ1~t~~~!,k!!en available to the plaintif;(' and his predecessors

,.i~,
\;;f~{Jf!Wt~r&
'~/ up'sl6i-:.c,dain

point of diversion, wllich- plainti.ff now seeks to
:> ·

particu1ar1:r s~t forth in. the Affirmative
''ses·•.{ :tn turther a:o.swer to paragraph lJ., this de.fend ant denies

¥'iiJlftJ;,J1at
·;1~i~tiff
":(y~'if::·~t,;~f·;~!,,~·;t-...t ·.
~i

~,.,.. :

or his predecessors have used water

.. .

lrih'iil& ::-Maud· O~eek

ior., 70 years t and alleges the fact to be

Eiii,¥~.J;/riiht:·"
initiated
.;tl\~~;"
i(( .:{~~}l\

1*::i

- i<·

..

, •. :

.{$l~t~~t~.i1tfi!~:1 ·

,$. ~'t,~ •

•

,·, . ~ ,., ·.

:' ..\\~*'}~'~TI}':-~

·;ifJl.~l(,.~~:S,. f-~e~ant

by plaintlhf.r or his predecessor
~

,.

.~

,.?:·

.

t:

·<' :,_.. t. ·.:i

?

\\

and

I

I.
I

t !
i~
i
m,:_:·

~

It'!
1ul_ .
t

l

.

admits,~ hat~:for more than 70 years he and

r.

i

I_:

...... .;~~·;itrd·;:;i1;;::~,;v:·"';i;er;~·r:~titflf~;;· of Minnie Maud Oreek,

.lit~ffifl~~Yi~ .~-~(

ti

i'i·

£nn:ifit:?,biuti~10x.<i:ek are junior to and inferior to the rights o!'

:.~di3t:e:na'ttji.t·:.i

~

always has been considerably more water

;l~wtJtl~itat!: ot: springs
~ ~~~·i?i:7

~

This defendant .further alleges that

=

ii

I
t~-

EV00308

000929

li

EV00309

000930

EV00310
000931

could not enlarge
and diminish or limit the

f

initiated, and that at said new

I

priority is fixed as of the date the

.

Third Affirmative Defense
never recognized the right of the pla.i ntiff

'

to move the point of diversion for plaintiff's
change was made many ;rears ago,

is not known to this defendant, this defenopenly, notoriously, adto divert the waters of
on to their lands in the swne quantities as a.re
has acquired
the waters
rig4ts

acquired under the

·1 t'hat 3l000, shares o"f stook
• >_r. ".lt;':••••

b.·r.h

• •: "

tr:i1l.;tltfui:~reterr e<L,,/t o dn

-~i(t~~~J§;•'iifo~·~1,,): • "

i._~,:. ...,,:

·

£.~hd·irlH:t~'ii·6'rf-"-her~~'ed!&-c es sor11

. ~,.~~;~:1~~~;~1·~·;61;_·

_.:

,t_..~

;lf'af.l~;,~i~if'bn "or~f~
...':fr ;

~·

right
•

.·~:~.a... ~,;,·. •.,,.:;~4-.f;~~;!~l:;-!-;::.·...
~ ''mtge·
ttt:·e right of this
... .:~

EV00311

000932

EV00312

000933

I..
r
,.~-

~

f.

.

i

to cross-plaintiff'.s rights 0

•····

EV00313

000934

I-

i

i

I
f

i
KELLER

~

1t.;\f

.·

;;j~:

orneya
·~~~

. ·' '

;J!;,-r~

~;·q'{f!t
, i~}

1~'

,.: k'i'r-i··

Oross~Plaintiff, .A.nlber Keel

. ?2 West Main ·

Price, Utah .

Q)::_.

~~l:

!j
i

l

i
i

j

l

l
J

mailed to plaintiff's attorney, Luke G.

%-1;- .•:••,

this)d_da.y of Octobe~,

11;,;

. ,;:~~.

a
1)

EV00314
000935

~~

:
.
\ J-~ .G,.:t-,,• •

... -;~{ . ... • •
\' :_ ,A;r.~,1 ~ /

'.~i'"''l}J:~.~
;ay.c?
~
!.~~1
_ ··. .;
,1, ,,; ~1~~,~-~~..; ;')'"lj,, ... n:~~;;c" ...;\y•.,,:f.tOi-,.'r.O:t
·: ~~. 4 •.

,,·,

. ,•;.;., ~,/Gi:imes,:now'' thl! ''de fondant T. F. Hounclcceper, and answers the
iollows:
l.

paragr a. ph 2
A:dm~ta para.graph

\)7jf

iJ_:1/i'(·:: 4. _,._ Adm1ta paragraph 4 .

lilfilll~fi!:~:~:::,:;dos

o! ID,orpm<ion

woru

cxccu<ed, but allege,

./': ·:1-·'.,'i:ii°.Ll th·c ·ArticTe11 provided that they would not become opcxative unl cu s and ~-p-

·t\kf{/;:J:{), :·,. ·. ,'-} :. _.:-. , .,.

i.:.'..": :.~',}t~'::3,;..000 shar,es·-.01 s·tock HhaU nave be en 11 ubocribed.
··.: :\~.~:.}~';"::.,:.:~:~r/.:;·/·~~:;J, .. :;_":: · ~

:,, . .....

...

;t,--;•.1,:-

..:;

That 3, ~00 shares were ·
.-Ji:. ~

. .

;'.'.·,\1-f-~·c;;,~~-j\;o~cribcii; : ci~d that tne :1°brp;oi°"a.tiou h.aa not func tioncd n.s such, Den1~e'··

~',ftt\St~ir.ftt~:tf::--.]./:.:-:/·: >, :·,·: --'i';./)t~-~~5-

0 '.:..

':°•'".r?},;;tlfo~·r ;_cm';dniiig :allcga'tfonfl° of;pa'l'iig'raph· 7.

Z{P:ili;~{\1.:~r?~·/FJ. /:· ·~..r~{~.:~:t~\:::.··~~/J/~\- ·tf?.):1~fr:i~~irt~?rt-

-?; .

._ •

~:,:.-1-:/·/\·),;;.:::1-.:i,:'::-,::_t.8.· : Dcrii'cs ,paragr·apli:·.8,;·::cxcept-.that he aclmits that Articl'ci'.o! Incorpo-

.. ~~";t~~~;.;:·:~~t~~::;::;~
~;~·i:'f:;.;,::j;>~· ·_. ·;·-~\··::~~,-~: : :_:-,;~':::·..·., :~~_-..r~&~;:;.(~~:~/:~·~::t:.-,,:. ;-\··--· ~'.:.;\.{~r ;r.::. .. ~:-~,.t<1~ .. ,.-;~\,~~:-~~\~7\ .... ,.__

;-'i{"? ,t'.;- :·, 1:.-:i_--.~ r .a _ti'on ,.y..-er·e signc d ;_. cont.,.·iriiiig<tlio'ilmnta:t1on ,a 'lfov·e·.-m-en tione·a. ·::uffp:i:ra'g:ra.ph 7

tWtf f }};~-\ /'_. :_\ :·: .;-·.<.:;r='i"_} }'':. (;~~\\U~}/~~:;i).:-:~ :C1:);~/\/r·? {-,,P.-._;i.;,,,'.-fJ,~,;:J18}:11~-

a

~. -... i

·.-;:,_::.- .~;:._-:, ...: ;:::-·of 'tl:i:i's answer,· and :th·a t ·e ha:rcs :-ofr stcic:k:wcr'e'.'°8UbBcribed':iri, th e7am·oUn1: sot

:t~::;;:~:~

W0i\1f, ' ...'\ft
;:r-,~'.~p.h•."'.;h'c~~J,;ili1JJI·t:f,~ttitL..: .
.._.

: '·'.'.-:'..</

~i:··=.;·t··:={~

,7:;;t)/{/.'.

;t:~~.:·~~-t~:

Admito ' tha.t 1tTii -b'c'ir_
ii_fic·~a1)·or)p'ia1nti.H-·.fo '. u:ii''c~\;,at·;;;-r::an/ piaintiI£'11
:.:· ., . -'::......
:;i,~ . ::.,_=.J.. :;.:...· . .. ·:. ·:~:,Y:·~(~l:):;:·:tt{f?iJ:;::q·~·~1
0,~1\1!;};.;:rt~,:;:':~?·:,':,.,£(t ::!;::).: !::;:4t"-~.-~t·.?i.
;and·,: 'Dcni'd tli:it,thc'i C"'h~s ib·Jl!·j'i'.~n:ny.f.g-r;bit':c1iM'xiilifilt:!'./Jiih'li~~i;y\(.';:;iJ ·denic u
_9;
I

··:. · ·'

:·

••

.-:"~·:~. (:,.~

4 _ )· ; :

,··

.r..r~.-J;:;{/{~:.:_r;2~::):~b}ffS;-~~1-~i~;:~}Ifitrfi~{J1:.~:?I~\.'.f!\:/f:· _:
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the point of diversion
to use.

This defendant further

originally established by a diligence
ha:; been conside rably more water available
of inflow than i s or has been

is more particularly set forth in
Defenses,

In further answer to paragraph 11, this defendant

: j fJ:i~;it i~:ciiically that plaintiff or his predecessors have used water from

~;f;:-~r1:?i t.:·::. -:· .
..•,.,_!.-Minnic ··Maucl.Creek for
1tr~.~~:r~~:J\

?0 years, and alleges the iact .to be that all water rights

..,..• . .-~~_:tl.\,'. fuifuted by plaintiff or his predecessor in Minnie Maud Creek are junior to

'.;;~:.'.t:~[~r~ '.'.·:>...inferior to the rights of this defendant,

'l\l:,: .,

·,:,':/:'!,:}_:;f~:a'lld

12.

Thi, dofondant admits that for more than 70 years he and hi,

,-.-,::.::-.,., prc·decessora have diverted the waters of Minnie Maud Creek, and as they now

v.~i~J~twtt1J&i .-:/- .·

r·''f·····-c~:t:,,,.,,~,;\,,, divert and use said waters, and this defendant admits that he claims the right

r;}~f@titf~t~;M
.:.-·
1!t{;.~?~f)f:ft.! fo : so utilize the .waters of Minnie Maud Creek.

ti,il,;~l!fI~i ~re ,uff:::en::::::h::::b::r:::::::~,:~:~::::: :::::::,:e:: :::::.

'· ..t·"·,·i~-.1••, ...,.~lj,•,.0

•. . . . . .

. . . ,·. - .,

:::tl'-~1\::;::r; . . }.:·:~n-..c.:~:.~~-:5;;. _:"-:?:,:·: :

pri.ated prior to 1903, and further alleges that at the point of diversion initiated

il;;ft~i:{~)t\k
...... ,.'i\_ ·.~·.i-;t4 :.r <·.
... =
. /( ·- · :. ·.f(' by ,the

\:(~{;lff1lV ·.
:. <~:-){=tj:l

·:

plaintiff and his predecessors there is water available in the stream,

and th.at had plaintiff and his predecessors continued to use said point of diver-

oi.oiL t~el'e wolild have.beer!. amule water to fill their a.porou.r iation under their

001318

iititrrtt!IJ!it1&f~ii[tfti

&i,i~i~~1.~;r;1:1l~1~;rf

d'ge)i'~tlia.".t~t:Ji'e·.:tli'ingit i ¾l::,'i{ouifiii(diversion was made without the filing

\:<itltit~~f!Jf}?!~}i)fff;·u?? i\ \?\:? ::1'
,,\C!iahg'e) a:p_plicationdn·:the '~ Ofiic'·e<;of the State Engineer

~*tj.~tW-J~:;:;':/:_~--·- ~_::,'f:;·/,:--·;·>.:';?'::·':);'Y::·
Mffe..9.t.:\?iJ',:,:!i'!.J?:~t .~~.~.d ,c ~ .~ge m point of diversion

I

~·i
~!

·

as is and was re-

;;

:'.

did not interfere with

.,

~:f.~~l~'f1{i.'.'*~\(./. ~:··:·.:,.·:/. ~ :.; ·: .·.:,:_ ~··_:

~~ ·1:b·r / rlghts··:ofit11i's· :acfori:dant b e cause the ne w point of diversion i!; also
· ··
vroii'tr.eam.:· from ., this 'defondant, and this'defendant has continued to USC the

.f~1t~?.r:f;r:1t·: i::\);r~:~. ~ ·: :·> :'. ·

)~f]tt};,,.::.,:jJ~}:. . .

·ter:(ap'prop:da.ted by him a nd by his predecessors, without regard to the
point of diversion by the plaintiff.
the allcr,ations o.f paragraph 15 .

f( :'·:<.D cnic ~ each and every allegation in the complaint not herein cx-

~?Jif~~·hriam'itted,

it~Jg:,;~~/;y way oi fu,thor answer and affirreative defense, thls defondant
:-JJ::;;r:{.lchnits,

denies and a 11,.,ge5 as follows:
First Affirmative Defense

l.

Thac when plaintiff's predecessors in interest initiated a diligence

utilize water from Minnie Maud Cre ek and at the subsequent tune wh en
~;i;,,;,:,-,.:,,:, .··.,~·'.,i'-·,f.--' the .Articles of Incorporation which are attached to plaintiff's complaint were

iR!~~::,~~J~~~~.~~r\~~·r.~r-~); :· .. .

1

1\?/f;.t;,,.<}'.)

.,~~xccuted, plaintiff' fl predecessor in interest used a point of diversion down-

/ftji!li1JI}'.'f~\!t,eam :~o:h~: ,:::•ao:,ili~:::::n.::::::::~:,:::~=;e •::::·Creek
t ,'if.,f:}ff- .\.''.'.-:. :·. ·./ : /ab ove

this origin.al point of diversion for the plaintiff' s right, which sour ces of

r'.: ('. · r:::::::":.::::::::::::::~:~::=~·:::~~~::.·o:~,~: :: : e:~i.~n

t'f-~ltl
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at his now claimed
years of adverse , open and
rights have been acquired under
defendant.
of the fact that 3, 000 shares of stock have never been

predecessors has ever recognized the validity of said corpora-

to exercise any corpoi·ate powers .

That the diligence right of

is prior in time to any o! the rights of the plaintiff.

That this

s ucc e6sor in interest to the r i ghts of T . F, Housekeeper, which
to the rights of the plaintiff.

That if the rights of

1:ver been prior to or superior to the rights of this deiendant
defendant denies) then nevertheless this defendant has for more

using without regard to the rights of the plaintiff, and under
supcriol· in priority to the rig hts oi the plaintiff, and
is entitled to continue to :;o use the water under the doctrine of
U!.le,

WHEREFORE, thio defendant prays that the court proceed to adjudge
the respective 1:ights of the parties, their points of divers ion, priorcllite"!I,

and all other elemcnt:J of their water rights.

This defendant iurthcr

;:pray11 that th<: court adjudge and decree that the rights of the plaintiff arc junior
'.:a n·d inferior to the rights of this defendant; that the rights of plaintiff were at
least originally for a point of diversion do wn11tream from that prcacntly cla.imod

001321

·l

,

e ;a:

t

..

;i~titfflJ!\~,i~r?"f?t~lf~1,1~",;. ., ;

·, a.1vci·s 10n ;-. tnat .th'e . cou:r:t adJU:d'g e '.; ~,,: ,-~:-:·,:·: ,; ', 7.'.\

...,.,.~,;1,};,;.~'.;.~;;.;::'.:<· . ;. ,,;,'. :. . ·...... -: :;:·:· .. ·.·: <·:·.: ·.. ~:-_·/

_,t',£r~j:by{tlris_;/c1cfenchi'n't ha 5 'been arid is l awful"; :_.,:".. ·.
·~:·.=. :· -~~~; ·._

;~~·)r=t}.f~::~:·:t::·-.~~-. .:·-;. . :
.[P

>,

1iS.:}itidifti'rtrie/ ·'rc\ie£ as appears

~T~~:@~?~~f·{Y:~f?}):;::·:::~
:~~ ~~~{~~:(· ~ ~· ~.

·si'l!,Yf:1G-ti:i:~f~til'1i:c·. c·1t r·t·a-i,ai:d

just and

. };: :

I •• ••-~.. ::

-~'

"

).:,•.(i- , .,. ;-;-; . .. A\ ~·.),: ·)f/--1.\
_. . .~.~-tl,Y.~c ___ ..

..........

cys for Dcfen'da.nt T.
Housekeeper

FV

th Seate Stn~ct
ity, U~\h

~::~:~,; :··--.

~)iif.~ti:~~b~{;,

of tho foregoing mailo d to plaintiff'" attorney, Luke G, Pappa,,

:~~i.{J::·,,:~lrJ :',East'·.M ain Street, Price, Utah, thi,; ,2:2_,

day oi May, 1957.

r/ -.JI.I,,;..,,(;} )(.(., ._J,l...~-:6./
-·-\-J~
.
------.::::=...--

/ (i)' _.:

) /t

",:

. . -:'. ·. ~..·;

.. ....

· ;-? ·: ·...

cq~itaoie: ::':···,

to tnis aetendant his cos ts incurred .: ,. .

CLYDE &: MECHAM

,.;4«'

/.:_'~,§d~1:t
. ::·:>·::··· r~:":.i::

·.J·_ ~- :.,~

•'

.·: . -~·!

·i
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Addendum 6

IN THE FOURTH JUDIC:t,.L DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR TBE
COµNi'Y OF DUCHESNE, STATE OP' UTAH

It.T 'l'BE MA'I'TER OF 'l'HE GENERAL
DETERMINATION O.F RIGHTS TO THE .fss.~ ©.:' .:\

USE Oli' ALl, WATER, BOTH SURFACE
AND UNDERGROUND, WI'I!HDl THE
DRAINAGE ARBA OF 'l'RE UIN'l'AB
BASIN AND LOWER GREEN RIVER
BASIN IN .UTAH.

CODE NO. 47

OBJEC'l'ION AND PROTEST Tffi PROPOSED DE'JJERMINATION
MADE F.i' STA'fE ENGINEER

*

*

LOOJ:S MOTTE objects .to the proposed dete:cmination made by
the State Engineer of the state of utah in the above matter as the
same relates to his water rights
water users claims in the Nine
Mile area and alleges as follows:
l. Objects to the denial. of water users Claims# 128 and 129
and any other Water Users claims on ·which an adverse report and determination was made by the State Engil'.leer .filed by Louis Motte which is
for irrigation water and stock water as aQ inci~eµta.l use for land on
Minnie Maud creek on the following 1rounds:
(a) 1'bat said water rights are not owned by the Minnie
Maus Irrigation company as stated 41. the state Engineer's report.
(b) That said water rights are owned by Louie Motte by
reason of use of said waters for irrigation purposes and stock watering purposes upon the land set fortb in said Water users claims prior
to 1903 and the use continuously thereof to date, and the right to
the use of said water is under what is commonly referred to as a
Diligence Claim.
(c) That said water rights are now owned by Louis Motte
by reason of adverse use 0£ said water right set forth in said Water
Users Claim ~y the open, notorious and continuous use of said water
on said lands prior to 1937.
(d) That the Minnie ~ud Irrigation company never did
acquire the said water righter thah the same was never transferred to
the M:l.nnia Maud I~riqation COI!\PanY and the
was not

an,

irri!Jj'i~~oE~

IN lllE DISTRICl' coiiif
DUafSlf C:tlJNW, sm,. Q.t 111AII

__l)Jl}iJ{

~Q{jfJoi

~

·~:::t
t9~ I

HT000061

001052

legally organized and ha~ not at any time, during its claimed existence,
contrplled and distributed the water rights on Nine Mile creek and
particularly the water rights of the petitioner herein.
DATED this 1st day of October, 1964.
F$.NDSEN AND KELLER

a~f2:t!A,~J
Attorneys for Petitioner
Professional Building
·Price, Utah

STATE OF UTAH

)

iaa.

CO"CJN'fi OF CARBON)

DUANE A. FRANDSEN being duly sworn upon oath deposes and
says:
That be is one of the attsrneys for the petitioner in the
above petition7 that he has read the same and knows the contents thereof
and the same is true and correct to the best of his knowledge and
information, except as to matters thc:!rein stated upon information and
belief, and as to those matters be l:>(llieves it to be true, that he
makes this verification on behalf of: the petitioner for the reason
that he is out of the city and not available to sign this verification
for himself.

1964.

Subscribed and sworn to befpre me this 1st day of October,

My Commission Expires:
2/4/66

;/}-;t~v ~. ~~

Notary PUblic

Residing at Price, Utah

on this 2nd day of October, 1964, I mailed a copy of the
foregoing O~jection and Protest to ~he following: Mr. Wayne D.
Criddle, State Engineer, State ca.piool, Salt Lake City, utah.

-~~

HT000062

001053

-.,

...

{ .

,

'"'

j,

IN mE FOUR'l'li JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF DUCHESNE, SV.'?E OF UTAH
IN 'l'BE MA'l"l'ER OF 'l'HE GJmERAL

DP:'l'BBMINA'l'ION OF .RJ'.GB'l'S 'l'O THE
USE Oi' ALL WATER, l!OTB smu'~CE
Am> mmERGROUND, WITHIN~
DRA:nmGE ARFA OF 'l'HE UDITAH

(

))
(
)

BASnT AND LOWER GREEN RJ:VER
BASIS' IN 'UTAH.

CODE NO. 47

(

AMENDED OBJli:Clt'ION ANp PRO'lES'l' 'l'O
PROPOSED DETERMINATIO!l MADE BY STATE ESGIHEER

*

•

'Ir

Petitioner, LOUIS MO'l"l'E, am~nds his prior objection and
protest .to proposed determination made by the State Engineer dated
October 1, 1964, by adding the follo~ing furthex o~jection as paragraphs :ff,2 and 3.
h
2. 'l'h.e state Engineer, in his proposed d~ination of water
rights, failed to include the fol~o~ng springs o6d by petitioner,
D:>uis Motte, which springs are used for stock wat~ing purposes and
have been so used since prior to l90B and continU?W3lY since that
time up to the present time. Said springs and th,flt:-forty a.ore tract
of land on which they are located ar.e as follows
(1) An unnamed apring Bast of Slaugluler Pen spring
located in the Northe2l.Bt Quarter of southwest Quarter of section 4,
TOWnship 12 South, Range l2 · East, wq'd,~h flows 0.10 cfs.
(2) AI1 unnamed spring West of Slaughter Pen Spring
located in the Northeast Quarter of .s outhwest Quarter of section 4,
Township 12 south, Range 12 East, wlµ.ch flows 0,10 cfs.
3. On claim #132 reported at Page 89 of the Blue Book of
porposed water determination by the State Engineer, said report. shows
said claim #132 owned by Louis Mott~ as the owner of Diligent spring
flowing O.ll cfs of water in the No~thwest Quarter of Southeast ouart~,
of section 13, Township 12 south, Rli\1198 12 East, and the flow of said
spring should be 0.25 ofa.
DA'l'ED this 4th day of Nove~ber, 1964.

:f

FBANDSEN AND lQ!:LLBR

20215
BY.~

~~/ e<c,,,,

Attorneys for Patitioner
Professional Building
~dt1e, Utah
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STATE OF UTAH

)

:as.

COUNTY OF CARBON}

DUANE A. FRANDSEN being duly sworn upon oath deposes~

says:
That he is one of the atto~neys for the petitioner i n
above petition; that he has read the same and knows the conten·
and the same is true and correct to the best of his knowledge
information, except as to matters therei n stated upon info:r:mat
belief, and as to those matters he believes it to be true; tba
makes this verification on behalf o~ the petitioner for the ra
that he is out ·of the City and not available to sigh this ver!
for himself.

::. ··.1·:

,.

··•

and sworn to before me this 4th day of NQ

NcftaryPublic

Residing at Price, Utah
Expires:

-7:\J,. .. '

· -; ·.'·.L, /

~

On this 4th day of November, 1964, I mailed a copy of the
:tfu:~:~ing objection and Protest to
following: Mr. Wayne D.
Criddle, state Engineer, State capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah.

the
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF DUCHESNE, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OP THE GENE.BAL
DETERMINATION OF RIGHTS TO THE
USE OF ALL WATER, BOTH SURFACE
Alm UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE
DR1\INAGE AREA OF Tm;l UINT}Mi
BASIN AND LOWER GREEN RIVER
BASIN IN UTAH.

CODE NO, 47

,

OBJECTION AND PROTEST TO PROPOSED DE~ERMI~Jl\TI9N
MADE BY STATE ENGINEER

*

·It

*

AMBER I<EEL objects to the proposed determination made by the
state Engineer of tne state of Utah in the above matter a13 tbe same
relates to her water rights and water users claims in the Nine Mile
area and alleges as follows:
1. Objects to the denial of Water Users Claims 4t 130 and 164
and any other Water Users Claims on which an adverse report and determination was :made by the state Engineer filed by Amber ICeel. whicll is
for irrigation water and stock water as an incidental use; for land on
Minnie Maud creek on the following grounds:
·
· (a) .T hat said water rights are not owned by, the Minnie
Maud Irrigation company as stated in the state Engineer'~ report.
(b) That said water rights are owned by Amber Keel by
reason of use of said waters for irrlgation purposes and stoolt watering
purposes upon the land set forth i11 .said water users cla:l,ms prior to
1903 and the use continuously thereof to date, and the right to the use
of said water is under what is commonly referred to as a Diligence claim
(c) That said water rights are now owned by Amber Keel
by reason of adverse use of said water right set forth in sa·id water
users Claim by the open, notorious and continuous use of Sqid water
on said lands prior to 1937.

/,

WRAdj 0146
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(d) That the Minnie Mauq Irrigation Company never did
ac<;1uire the said water righta7 that the same was never transferred to
the Minnie Maud Irrigation Company and the urigation company was not
legally organized and has not at any time , during its claimed existence,
controlled and distributed the water rights on Nine Mile Creek af?-d
particularlr the water rights of the petitioner herein .
2. Object to the denial of w~ter users claim #23 filed by
petitioner Amber Keel on an unnamed spring under application #6563 and
certificate· of Appropriation #689 in ~he Utah State Engineer's office,
which is shown in the state Engi neer's report as o~med by A. z. Thompson,
and that said right is covered by Water users claim# 1093 by the
Bureau of Land Manage!'lent. This spring, used for stock wate:i:;ing purposes, is owned by petitioner Amber K~el and she received a conveyance
of said water right from her father, It. z . Thompson, many years p r ior
hereto and that . a ·deed of said water Eight was recorded in the Duchesne
County Recorder ' s Office in Book 20 of needs, at Pages 92 and 93. '.I'he
water from said spring · has been used eontinuously since the date of
appllcation by petitioner and her pre4ecessors in interest to water
livestock and the spring is 1ocated on patitioner's Bureau of Land
Management's allottment from the Bure~u of Land Management,
DATED this 1st day of Octobe~, 1964.
FRANDSEN AND KELLER .

i'!fZ. t!(;tifi;:<--·· z,.L

ea,,J.

~y
Attorneys for Petitioner
Professional Building
Price, Utah

STATE OF UTAH
l
•BS .
COUNTY OF CARB0N)
says,

DOA~ A. FRANDSEN being duly sworn upon oath deposes and

That he is one of the attorn~ya for the petitioner in the
above petition; that he has read the $arne and knows the contents thereof
and the same is true and correct to the best of his knowledge and
information; except as to matters t herein stated upon information and
belief, al'l.d as to those matuers he be~ieves it to be tzue; that he
makes this verification on behalf of ~he petitioner for the reason·
that she is out of the city and not available to sign this verification f9r hersel f .

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1st day of October,
1964 .

My Commission Expir~s:
2/4/66

WRAdj 0147
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on this 2nd day of October, 1964, I mailed a. copy of the
foregoing Objection and Protest to tqe following: Mr . Wayne D.
Criddle, State Enginee~, State capit~1, S~lt Lake City, utah.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CIYURT, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF DUCHESNE, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL
DETERMINATION OF RIGHTS TO THE
,USE OF ALL WATER, BOTH SURFACE
AND UNDERGROUND, W:CTHIN THE
DRAINAGE AREA OF .THE UINTAH
BASIN AND LOWER GREEN RIVER
BASIN IN UTAH.

CODE NO. 47

OBJECTION AND PROTEST TO , PROPOSED DETERMINATION
MADE BY STATE ENGINEER

*

II:

BERNARD IRIART, ALBERT THAYN and WILLIAM c. DAUSE object to
the proposed determination made py the State Engineer of the State of
Utah in the above matter as the same relates to their water rights .
and water users claims in the Nine M;l.le area and allege as follows:
1. Object to the denial of water users Claims# 368 and 369
filecl by Bernarcl Iriart which is for irrigation water for land on
.Minnie Maod Creelc on the following grounds:
(a) That saicl wate;i: rights are not o~med by the Minnie
Maud Irrigation Company as stated i~the state Engineer's report.
(b) o;rhat said water rights were formerly owned by
Bernard Iriart and are now owned by Albert Thayn and William c. Dause
by reason of use of said waters for irrigation purposes upon t11e land
set forth i.n said Water Users Claims• prior to 1903 and the use continuourly thereof to date, and the righ~ to the use of said water is undex
what is commonly referred to as a Diligence claim.
(c) That said W/i.ter r.i\ght is now owned by Albert Thayn
and William c. Dause as the successors of Bernard Iriart by reason of
adverse use of said water right set forth in said water Users Claims, l
the open, n~torious and continuous use of said water on said lands
prior to 1937.

FILED

IN 'fHf DISTRICT COURT
DIICttl:SNE r.ou~rv, STATE OF UTAH
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{d) That the Minnie Maud Irrigation company never did
acquire the said wc1ter right1 that the same was never trc1I1aferred to the
M1nnie Maud Irrigation Company e.nd the irrigation company was not
legally organized and baa not at any -ti1ne, during its claimed existence,
controlled. ancl distributed the water l:lighta on Wine Mile creek and
particularly the water rights of the Betitioners herein.
2. The sta't e Eng:i.neer, in his proposed detez;mination of water
rights, failed to inclucle the followia,g springs which were formerly
owned by Bernard lriart and are now o$ed by Albert Whayn and William
c. Dause as his successors in intereau, and _w hich springs are used
for stock watering purposes and have been so used since prior to 1903
and continuously since that time up td the present date. Said springs
and the forty acre tract of land on '?liich ·they are located are as
follows:
(1) An unnamed spring lqcated at the mouth of Minnie
Maude Canyon in the NE¼ :sE\ of Sec, 18, Twp. 12 s,
Range 13 East.
{2) An unnamed spring lqcated at the forks of Jim's
Canyon in SE¼ sw~ of sed. 22, Twp. 12 south, Range
13 East.
·
(3) An unnamed spring on the East side of Shelby
ThoJl\Pson's cabin ~ c w a e2) in the NW¼ NW¼ of
Seo. 25, Twp. 12 East, ~ange 12 south.
(4) An unnamed spring lqoated at the point of Myron's
Ridge in the NE\ sw¼ of Seo. 30, TWp, 12 South, Range
13 East.
(5) An unnamed spring oq t11e East side of Pole canyon
Riage in the SW¼ SW¼ of'Sec. 30, Twp. 12 South, Range
13 East.
(6)An unnamed d~rge spr~ng on the lower center of
Pole canyon Rid.ge in th~ SW~ NE¼ of Sec. 25, Twp. 12
south, Range 12 East,
(7) An unnamed spring wl!,ich is the lower spring at
the West face of Haysta~k Pinnacles in the SE¼ SW~
of Sec. 19, Twp. 12 south, Range 13 East.
(B) An unnamed spring lecated on a brancl1 or Pole canyon
l:>elow Thayn' s cabin in i:he swi4 sw\ of sec. 31, Twp. 12
South, Range 13 East.
{9) An unnamed spring lq,oated on the branch of the left
fork of Pole canyon in the NW¼ NE/.,i of Seo. 31, Twp. 12
South, Range 13 East.
{10) Pine Spring, which is located at the North end
of Long Hollow in them.¼ SE¼ of Seo. 18, Twp. 12
south, Range 13 East, ·
(ll)An unnamed. spring which is the upper spring at the
base of Haystaclc Pinnacie in the N.E¼ sw;l.,, of sec. 20,
Twp. 12 South, Range l3'Bast.
{·12) An unnamed spring ~t Lewery' s Cabin in Spring
Canyon in the NW¼ NE¼ of sec. 29, Twp. 12 South, Range
13 Bast.
(13) An unnamed spring. located on a branch off the right
fork of Jim's canyon in the SW~ SW¼ of sec. 22, Twp. 12
South, Range 13 East.
(14) An unnamed apring ~n the right fork of Jirn'a Canyon
in the NW~ SE¼ of Seo. 28, Twp. 12 South, Range 13 East.

I
I

I

I

I
I
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That these fourteen springs ~re all located in Nine Mile
within the Green River draim1ge and w.1(thin the area which -!:he Court
is m..aking a determination of the wate~ rights and should be included
in the final court Order making such qetermination.
DATED this 1st day of Octobe~, 1964.
FRANDSl!lN AND I~LLER

BY

f;t:a~kd

Attorneys orthesePetitioners
Professional Building
Price, Utah

STATE OF UTAH
)
COUNTY OF CARBON) 8 ~·
DU1\NE A, FRANDSEN being duly -sworn upon oath deposes and
says:
That he is one of the attorn~ys fof the petitioners in the
above petition; that he has read the $Jame and knows the contents thereof
and the same is true and correct to the best of his Jcnowledge and
information; e)mept:1as to matters thefein stated upon information and
belief, and as to those matters he he~ieves it to be true; that he
rnaJce·s this verification on behalf of the petitioners for the reason
that they are out of the City and not available to sign this verification for themselves.

subscribed and sworn to befdre me this 1st day of October,
1964.

My Commission Expires:
2/4/66

On this 2nd d.ay of October, 1964, I mailed a copy of the
foregoing Objection and Protest to tl,e f0llowing: .Mr. Wayne n.
Criddle, State Engtneer, State capit~l, Salt Lake city, U'tah .

. Secretary
~a-< ~ 4 e

<
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THE Dl:S'ra.IC'P COUUT 9J!' TllE FOURTH JODICllL DJ:ST.1ICT, L'1 ,.AND FOil.
DUCHESNE ·COUNTY, ST.iTE OF UTAH

D! TllE )IATTER OF THE GEliERA.L

DETEruilN.\.TION OF THE WATEil
:;uGilTS TO THE USE OF lf4,TER BOTH
SWP'.ACE AND UNDERGROUHD A.ND

WI.THIN THE DR.ADU.GE AREA OF THE
UINT~ BA.SIN IN UTAH.
OBJECTION TO THE PROPOSIDD DETI!:RHINiTION
OP' THE W.A.TER RIGHTS OF THE STATE ENIGNEER,

~INE HILE CREEK DIVISIOll CODE 4?,
l,

Co111e s now Clive Spro\\B e and Myrtle Hae Spr~11Be , husband

and wife, and Willis Ha.=ersruidt and Wilma Hammerel!lidt, hueband and
wif'e, and ~ile thiB their objection to the proposed deter111ination
o:f t:q_~ir water rights in the Uintah 3sBin Nine Hile Creek Division,
Code 47, Township 11 South, S.L.E,M, to TownsW.p 12 So\,th, S,L,B.H.
Central Unit,

Theee ob.jeotors allege tbat Clive Sprouee and ,~yrtl.e

!•i:ae Sp1•ouse, husband and rlfe,

a.rJ

the ownere of the :following de~-

cribed real. property situated in carbon Co,wty, State o:f Utah, and
that they are selling the said l.and \.mder contract ' to · 1fillis
:.:Ja:nmerentldt and Vilma llarnmersmidt, husband l!l.Ild 1'1if'e, together with
the water rights thereunto belonging including irrigation, domestic,
cul.linary and etock ,tatering belonging to tlle said land, that the

eaid land is described as fol.lows;
The weet half of the north1,est quarter of Section
14, To,mship l.2 South, ~ange l) East, of' the Sa.1 t
Lake Meridil!.ll.,
llao, the northeast qua.r ter; the eaet half of the
northwest quarter of Section 15, Township l.2 South,
ne.nge lj East of the Salt Lalte Meridian, lase
piece to ~mber Xeel .
2.

That these objeotora · ar• informed and believe and so

all:egee that their predeoeseorzi in intereet acc;,\tired water rights

for irrigation, domestic, oullinary and stock watering trom lli.nnie
1,:11.ud Creelc: by going upon the said land and divertit'lg th11 water f'rou1
the }!innie lraud Creu 1 and conveyi.ug t!1e eame in ditches to the said
land iu 1385 and using the said water thereon tor irrigation, domestic

1i1 :C L E D
IN THE DISTRICT cowrr
»IJC!lfSNf COONTY, STAlf OF UTAH

00084.

~l~
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C>
culli.nary and stock watering 1n1rposes.

Th11,t the said water has been

used oontinously without interruption since the said time upon the
~aid la.i1ds and that there are

55, 10 ac1·es or m~re under irriga.tio:1

and stock watering ~or 150 cattle and lf horses,

J,

That the State Engineer by the proposed de~ermination

a£ water right11 froa1 the :i.annie l•laud Creek has set forth in said
proposed determin!!!,t:l..on on file herein, under claill1s number11 188
and 189 on page 106 of said proposed determination, proposes that
the court adjudicate the water belonging to the said lands of thel!le
objectors, by adjudicating the right 0£ use of the said waters to
the I1innie }!aud Irrigation Co1,tpany,

These objeotor11 obj eat that

.their water rights to 1:1.Il.d fo1• the said land being aesigned,

transfei"Ted

or set over to, or the right to distribute given, turned or adjudicated
to the 1'1innie Maud Irrigation Company. For the reaso,, that the water
rights to the said land belonging to these objectors, and not to the
Hinnie Uaud Irrigation Company,

The Hinnie Maud Irrige.t1on Company

does not own the· said water rights to the said land,

to any right,
upon

01.•

or i t is entitled

title or interest in or to the said water rights used

belonging to the said land, Thnt the :1-1.iruu.e Haud Irrigation

Company is defunct and non-exie·tant i and hae been for ninny )'ears
last past,

That these objectors are inf'orrued and believe and so

f!lllege that the said Minnie I,Ia1.1d J:i.•riga.tion Company has failed to
oarry,...eut t~e purposes i t is purported to have been organized for,

Th.at it has not distributed the water of' these objectors, or to 1ts
stodkholders, and tllAt these objectors a.re i.ni'ormed and believe and
I
ab allege that i t did no ·t distribute the water to their predecessors
in interest,

That i t bas not built, or maintained dams, canals or

ditches to co11vey and distribute the water from the Z.1.1.nn.ie Uaud
Creek·,

That i t ha!!! not levied assess111ents or e:teroil!led jurisdiction

or control 1.mde:x- the said waters of' the t.rinnie Maud Creel, for a long
period of years, if at all,

That the water belonging to.tne · said

land of these objectors hae been diverted by them or their predeoessorl!I

HT000066

001063

()
-.'.3in i11terest fror.i its natural oha.nnel to theii· said la.i.1ds by , daUJs and

tli tches bolonging to the:,e objecto1.·s and their predecessors in .interest, and that said water has been used by them a11d their predeoesi,ors
u11der claim of right upo11 their lands :tor a long period of' time,

4,

That a.s a further objecUon these objectors alle~e that

the Hi1mie )laud Irrigat:l.oo Compally ha.5 no r:Lght, title or intere11t
in 01.• to the said water rights used upon the l.and.11 of these objectors,
That i t has no valid conveyance to the water of' theea objectors
lnnd, nor does it have a right to control or supervise its use, or
make distribution or to e::i:eroise auy a11thority over its u!le,

5,

Tha.t as a further and separate objection these

objectoi•s allege that if' l!laid Minnie Haud Irrigation Company ever
had, or acquired any right, t:ltle or interest i11 or to the water
rishts used upon tlle said lands of thees objectors, that the eame
has been lost, tl1rough adverse, t'U5e of these objecto1.•s and their
predecessors in intore,et,

That these ohjectors have used the gaid

,,, ater for irrigat~. on, oullinary, domes';ic and stool: watering purposes
,uider cla.i1:i of right and t:!. tle, oontin..•.onsly n.nd I'd thout :!.11terruption
:from the 1-! inn.i e ~lal.j.d Irr:l.ga tion Coopan~• or a.n1•one else, a.1noo the

3•ear 1918 and prior thereto, and that the said nse uas opened
notorious and l1os.tile and adverse to t:ie i·iahts of the l•!innie Ua,,d
Irriaation Company a.11d all othere' alld to the wholo world.
lllfilP.;!:J!'Or.E,

these objectors pi•ay that the court find,

dec1.•ee and adjudge that the waters and ,,rater rights bel.ougi11g to
the ·said land herein described in the :J.!:101mt of'

55, 10 aoras or :t,ore,

to.:;:et:!ie:1: with the stock ,rateri11g, dome,stio and cullinary water belonging to and are the property of these objectors, and that all
rights of these objectors in and to the said water be quieted as aG!'-"'
inst every claim, right, title a.i1d interest of each and all olaiuante,
and tha.t lfit1nie .-iaucl Irrigation Compo.ny and all othe,1• clai~1ants, and
e&ch of then1, do not have any right, title or interest in and to the
:said ..\l'Etters or water rights helo1,ging to the iia id l~1d and that these
obJeotora are the owners and holders o:f the ea.id water and water righta

HT000067
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-4:free and cl.ear of' all claims, rights and interest of any other person
or parties,
That the ~linuie 1:aud Irrigation Company and every other
pereon or party or partie111 1 and ea.oh 0£ the111,
enjoined from setting up any olaj,m, right,

eha.l.1 be perc1anently

title or interest in and

to the waters belo11ging to the said land or any part thereof'.
That tha objectors shall have such o·ther, further and
di:f'f'arant relief', both .laga.1 and aqui tabla as n1ay be ll!eet in the
premiee!I,

ttornay
l3ono1no :auJ.lding
rice, Utah
J~ddress of' Objectors:
Clive Sprouse & 1,!yrtl.e ?-Iae Sprouse
nooeeve.l t, Utah
Address of Objectors1
Ui.lli3 Tia1mneremidt cl, Vilma Uamzaeramidt
445 ~aet 1st South
·
Price, 'ITtah ·

ST..I.TE OF UTAll
es

County of' Carbon

)

lfILLIS l:Wll-.lERSHIDT, one of the Objectors above named,
being duly sworn as follows:

I am one of the objectors in the

aboye entitled action, I have raad the foregoing objections and
l.now ~he contents thereof and that the same ie true of ray own
knowledge except a11 to r.iattere therein stated upon in:l:'orL,ation or
bslie:t', a.r..d ae to those ;natters, .I believe i t to be true,

Subscribed and sworn to befo:!:'e me this

,;;r

day

of October, 1964,

,,:y Commission Expires!
Jan-q,ary 21, 1966

HT000068
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S~!WICE DY i.~ILIN~ ·
I

h .e reb)• certify tlll!- t on the lat day o:r October, .A., D, ,

196!~, I aerved t,10 copies of the above e.nd foregoil1g Objection
to the Propoeed Determination of the 1Tater nights of the Sta.ta

:Engineer, l1ine ~lile Creek Divieion Code

47, on lfayne D, Criddle,

:Jta.te Engineer of Utah by caili11g to hio f'rom Price, Utu, postage
prepaid, e. true oopy thei•eof' addressed to him as :fol,lows:

H.?:' , l'la.yne D, Criddle
State l!:ngineor
State Capitol Euilding
Salt LeJ,e City, u·tah

:for Objectors

J ~onomo auilding
Price, Utah

HT000069
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Addendum 7

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT-DUCHESNE
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
)

GENERAL DETERMINATION OF
WATER,
Petitioner,

)
)
)

) Case No. 560800056
)

vs.

) Transcript of:
)

HAMMERSCHMID TRUST,

) CROSS MOTIONS FOR
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Respondent.

)

______________ )

BEFORE THE HONORABLE SAMUEL P. CHIARA

DUCHESNE 1
EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT
21554 w. 9000 s.
P .0. BOX 990
DUCHESNE, UTAH 84021

NOVEMBER 24, 2015

TRANSCRIBED BY: BRAD YOUNG
NOTEWORTHY REPORTING 801.634.5549

002127

1

water.

2

existed.

3

and she won.

4

existence was not an issue.

5

She didn't care who Minnie Maude was or whether it
She said, huh-uh, I have got rights on that creek,
She prevailed.

So, again, the corporate

Now, let's step back and just talk very briefly about

6

what a general adjudication is.

7

on a system, on a drainage get involved in a general

8

determination of the water rights on the entire source.

9

could be a river, it could be a lake, it could be springs, lots

10

of sources.

11

claimants file their claims.

12

As the Court is aware, users

It

And the first thing that happens is the -- the

The State Engineer goes out and does a field

13

evaluation, creates hydrographic survey maps.

14

to our memorandum, and I have got some blow-ups here.

15

State Engineer basically says, okay, you tell me you are

16

irrigating a hundred acres with "X" amount of water.

17

to go find out.

18

the basis, the measure and the limit of a water right.

19

because you have a piece of paper that says you can irrigate a

20

hundred acres doesn't mean that's your water right.

The

I'm going

Because, as the Court knows, beneficial use is

So the State Engineer does a map.

21

We attached some

Just

He maps the

22

sources.

He maps the irrigated acres and figures out, okay,

23

farmer "X" is actually only irrigating 80 acres, so that's what

24

his water right is.

25

maps and data -- this is the PD from this case.

Then the State Engineer creates, using
As you can see

24
002150

1

it's a big piece of work.

2

degrees of thickness.

3

what these water rights are, and if you disagree with it you

4

have got 90 days to file an objection and you litigate.

5

that's what we are doing today.

6

They all look like this, in various

And he issues the PD and says this is

And

So Amber @Kehl and others object and say, no, you got

7

everything right in that PD except the owner of the water

8

right.

9

recognize that for EnerVest and the Hammerschmids and the

There is no Minnie Maude.

So it's important to

10

Mottes, who are opposing Carlsen, we are not seeking to undo

11

anything.

12

changes exactly how this water has been used in terms of

13

amount, location, point of diversion, purpose of use, place of

14

use.

15

Its only mistake was identifying Minnie Maude as the owner.

16

A decision in our favor on this motion in no way

None of that changes.

The PD got it all exactly right.

So I have got some blow-ups I would like to walk the

17

Court through.

Your Honor, these are just easier-to-handle

18

versions of the things I have got blown up.

19

example , the first page of what I just handed you and what is

20

on the easel is a -- let me explain one last thing about the

21

PD.

22

will use hash marks to identify irrigated acres.

23

outlined that here in green.

24

property descriptions.

25

always within these red lines for the properties.

So this is an

What you have is maps the State Engineer creates, and he
We have

The red are the actual deeds,

You can see the irrigated acres are
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1

So the State Engineer creates this map, and then

2

THE COURT:

3

So the little highlights in blue are the

number of acres in that area that are under irrigation?

4

MR. WRIGHT:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. WRIGHT:

Urn, in the blue?

No, those are

I see a two and a two and a -Yeah, they are all twos and threes.

Let

7

me -- let me -- I need to explain, basically, what we did.

8

What we did, a PD, you think of it as a left side/right side

9

book.

You start here, and you read to the right across both

10

pages.

And so what the State Engineer does is takes the data

11

from the maps and puts it in writing.

12

property owners, irrigated acres, amount of water, point of

13

diversion, and all of that gets translated into writing in the

14

book.

15

So it will identify

And, for example, here point of diversion, property

16

descriptions, they will match what's on the map.

17

extent and place of use.

18

township, range, section, all that stuff, where you are using

19

water, and how much you are using here, 10.6 acres, 5.4 acres.

20

So that gets translated into writing.

21

And purpose,

They will identify it by, you know,

And then when we get to the maps -- I don't know that

22

we have got the copies attached here -- but the maps work the

23

same way.

24

did in order to fit them on a blow-up page is we crunched two

25

maps together.

You can -- you can put them side by side.

So you have got this is map 1

What we

this is map 1,
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1

this is map 2.

They are crunched together, so you have a

2

continuous picture of one particular set of users.

3

trying to make this as clear as I can.

4

confusing.

I'm

It's a little

But let's start with Carlsen.

5

So

This map is a

6

reflection of Carlsen's predecessors and the right that was

7

authorized for use of water in the (inaudible).

8

look at one of their exhibits, Carlsen's exhibit, it's

9

No. 10 -- or maybe that was we numbered it 10 -- but, anyway,

Now, if you

10

it's a letter (inaudible), June of 2000.

11

attempt, before any of this litigation ever starts, he writes

12

the State Engineer and says I own 60 percent of the shares of

13

Minnie Maude, and I want you to update title to these water

14

rights in my name.

15

It is kind of a more-structured process than it used to be.

16

But it is basically the same thing.

17

It's Carlsen's

Today it's called a report of conveyance.

He is saying I want to be identified as the owner of

18

60 percent of all of the water rights (inaudible) in this PD.

19

His argument is there was a Minnie Maude.

20

Or he wasn't issued, he purchased shares as a successor in

21

interest.

22

dissolved in 1974.

23

assets; i.e., water rights.

24

It's one of the blow-ups.

25

I was issued shares.

And Minnie Maude no longer exists.

See, it has been

Under the law I get 60 percent of all its
And I will show you that letter.

So he says to the State Engineer update the title,
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1

take Minnie Maude off, put me on, 60 percent of all of the

2

water rights.

3

his chain of title.

4

original hydrographic survey map you will see the name Glen

5

Allred.

6

title from Allred to Ernest Davis.

7

the head of that litigation in the 50's.

8

to Carlsen.

But you have got to go back one step further in
He didn't go back far enough.

That's Carlsen's predecessor.

9

On the

He traces his chain of

We know who he is.

He was

And then a chain down

He starts, when he submitted this stuff to the State

10

Engineer in that June of 2000 letter he starts this chain of

11

title with Davis, but that's not far back enough -- back far

12

enough.

13

ground in red, and Allred was irrigating these green

14

highlighted pieces, and those show up in the PD in written

15

form, in very precise acreages, 10.9, 13.2, 12.59.

16

some that are, you know, 2.3.

17

acreages.

You have got to go back to Allred.

Allred owned this

There are

There are very precise irrigated

So that's where the -- the award process starts.

18

Now, you go to the second page.

This is the written

19

translation of the map I just showed you.

20

rights 197 and 299.

21

And you will see it in the name of Minnie Maude Irrigation,

22

care of Ernest Davis.

23

and place of use .

24

acres.

25

just little spots of land they were finding sufficient to

You will see water

They all have the same prefix.

It's 90.

And here is identified purpose, extent

By extent we are talking about irrigated

And again you see very precise, .6, .85.

These are
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1

cultivate and irrigate.

2

conveys to Ernest Davis, Davis down the chain to Carlsen.

3

And Allred owned that ground.

He then

Now, for purposes of the argument, I have isolated

4

just -- just four water rights, the EnerVest rights and the

5

Carlsen rights, just to show a contrast.

6

Motte rights that are also relevant here today, the same

7

situation.

We are just -- we just didn't try to map those.
So this is the 2000 -- June 2000 letter, excerpts of

8

9

The Hamnerschrnid and

it, written to the State Engineer by Carlsen's attorney.

First

10

of all, they admit all they have been able to (inaudible) only

11

2,377 shares were issued.

12

parties to the 1957 lawsuit.

13

the Articles of Incorporation.

14

Ernest Davis himself pleaded in that '57 litigation, he

15

admitted only 2,377 shares were issued.

16

attempting to address the question, okay, the PD says Minnie

17

Maude.

18

trying to get a resolution to that question.

19

These seven shareholders were all
That's the same amount that's in
It's the same amount that

There is no Minnie Maude.

This is Carlsen

What do you do next?

He is

So if he starts this chain of title, and he explained

20

to the State Engineer why he is entitled to 60.12 percent of

21

all the water rights, he owns 60.12 percent of the shares of

22

the would be Minnie Maude corporation.

23

of title with Ernest Gates, a deed, 1962, down t o Carlsen.

24

Well, we have got the deed.

25

But he starts his chain

It shows it starts with Allred, who owned the ground

29
002155

1

when the deed was first issued, and he was the guy actually

2

doing the irrigation.

3

plumb@ diversion.

4

beneficial use on ground he owns and that Carlsen has never

5

owned, using water that Carlsen has never used.

6

He was the guy that identified the

He is the guy that has put the water to

And then this is the ultimate remedy that Carlsen is

7

seeking from the State Engineer and which he seeks today.

8

is what a judgment in his favor gets him.

9

show why it simply does not work.

10

This

And we are going to

He says, "In light of the foregoing, would you please

11

amend the Davis" -- I'm sorry -- "the Division's records to

12

show Michael Carlsen as the owner of 60.12 percent of water

13

right numbers 924, 184," etc., etc., all the way through.

14

Those are all of the rights at issue before you today.

15

EnerVest owns two of them, Mottes own some, Hammerschmids own

16

three.

17

What Mr. Carlsen is seeking is 60 percent of all the

18

water awarded in the PD that was never used on any ground that

19

he has ever owned, never used by any of his predecessors,

20

always used by EnerVest and/or its predecessors or Hammerschmid

21

and their predecessors or Mottes or their predecessors, on

22

ground that they own and only they have ever owned.

23

words, he wants to reach across the entire award and grab

24

60 percent of EnerVest's right, 60 percent of Mottes',

25

60 percent of Hammerschmids', 60 percent of everybody that's in

In other
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1

MR. WRIGHT:

He might have.

He might have had the

2

Articles of Incorporation.

3

evidence of corporate existence.

4

what he had no authority to do was decide whether Minnie Maude

5

actually existed.

6

7
8

9

He might have had all kinds of
But what he didn't do and

That's a question ripe for the Court.
As far as whether they thought Minnie

THE COURT:

Maude owned it, that deed would make it seem pretty clear?
MR. WRIGHT:

Yes, yes, yes.

And -- and Ernest Davis

may have taken that to him and said, see, Minnie Maude owns --

10

owns these rights.

11

make that determination, that decision in the 50's litigation.

12

So Ernest Davis, maybe he wants to get out ahead of the PD and

13

say, I am going to file this case.

14

question of Minnie Maude's existence resolved one way or

15

another, and then we will go forward.

16

And the State Engineer isn't the officer to

THE COURT:

We are going to get this

It gets stayed

How does the PD show -- so on these maps

17

and on the books, the PD would show the owner of the land being

18

the individual landowners --

19

MR. WRIGHT:

20

THE COURT:

Correct.
-- it would show the owner of the water

21

right being Minnie Maude, and then it would show the amount of

22

land irrigated and the volume and the flow rates.

23

MR. WRIGHT:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. WRIGHT:

Exactly.
(Inaudible) Minnie Maude is the owner
Except on the maps.

You are right
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1

except on the maps.

2

the owner .

3

also identifies.

4

5
6

On the maps I just showed you Allred is

And there are other -- there is another map that
Let me just get to that.

THE COURT:

(Inaudible) the PD identifies Minnie

Maude as the owner?
MR. WRIGHT:

Yes.

Despite the fact that on the maps

7

it identifies actual property owners.

8

Christensen.

9

the EnerVest version of the map.

Here is Thomas A.

He is EnerVest, predecessor of EnerVest.

This is

Again, two maps shoved

10

together just for convenience purposes.

You have irrigated

11

acres in precise determinations, 2.4, 6.6.

12

These water rights are approved for use only on this

13

property and only in these amounts, and these water rights are

14

not approved for use anywhere on any property owned by Carlsen

15

or any of his predecessors.

16

the -- that's the square peg/round hole that's going on in the

17

PD is he identifies property owners on maps, says this is what

18

you can use, and in no way blends them, in no way does the PD

19

says Carlsen's predecessor, Allred, can use some of the water

20

on Christensen's ground or vice versa.

21

use of the water on very specific properties, and it is

22

undisputed who has owned them, it is undisputed who has

23

actually put the water to beneficial use, where and for how

24

long and for what purpose.

25

That's the disconnect.

That's

It onl y authorizes the

Again, somehow, for some reason, the PD, when it gets
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C E R T I F I CA T E

1

2
I, BRAD J. YOUNG, hereby certify that I transcribed

3
4

the electronic recording of the proceedings in the above-

s

entitled and numbered matter and that the foregoing is a true

6

and correct transcription, except where it is indicated that

7

the recording was inaudible, to the best of my understanding,

8

skill and ability on said date.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 18th day of June,

9

10

2016.

11
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13
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PARR WADDOUPS BROWN·

GEE°&li5VELESS ~~~
Attornqs at Ul1lJ

DANIE!. A. JENSEN

June 28, 2000

HAND-DEL:CVERED

Utah Division of Water ~ights
1594 West North Temple, Suite 220.
Sa.l t Lake City, UT B.4114
Re:

Minnie Maud Reservoir and Irrigation Company

Water Right Nos. 90-24, 90-184, 90-18S,
90-196, 90-1~7, 90-188, ~0-189, 90-190,.
90-191, 90"196, 90-197 and 90-299
Ladies and Gentlemen:
Based on discussions with Jim Riley, I am submitting this
request to update your records regarding ownership of a portion of
the . water rights now listed in the name of the Minnie Maude
Irrigation Company, which rights allow diversion and use of water
from Minnie Maud Creek {aiso known as Nine Mile Creek) in Carbon
County.
Th~ follow:j.ng facts are taken from (1) the Articles of
Agreement of Incorporation of the Minnie Maud Reservoir and
Irrigation Company, and (2) a Compl.aint filed by Ernest E. Davis,
Jr. on May 4, -1957 in the Seventh Judicial District Court for
Carbon County to resolve .a n ownership dispute over the use of water
rights owned by the Minnie Maud Reservoir and Irr:i,gatio:h Com~any
(see attached copie~). The M:i,nnie Maud Reservoir and Irrigation
Company .(the "Company") was organized as a, Utah corporation ·on
March 27, 1902. The Company's water rights came from conveyances
of the orig~nal shareholders' ·water rights in Minnie Maud Creek.
The company issued 2,377 sha~es of stock and, as of 1957, the
Company had seven shareholders with ownership as follows:.
Ernest E. Pavis , Jr:
Thomas Chris.t ensen
Bud Christensen
T ..F. Housekeeper

Amber Keel

199½.shares
199½.shares
260·shares
18_2 shares

Louis Motte
Bernard lriart
TOTAL

1,429 shares

68 shares

39 shares

2,377 shares

These seven shareholders were all parties to . the 1957 lawsui.t .
CARL-DWR2. ca

185 South State Smet• Sllite 1300 • Salt We Cii.y, Utah 84111..;1537
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Utah Division of Water Rights

June 28, 2000
Page 4

water rights and water shares formerly owned by the Davis family
{and thereafter by the- Wimmer family) .
On June 27, 200·0 I filed
with yol!-Z' office five Reports of Water Right Conveyance documenting
the transt:er of title from the Wimmers to Mr. Carlson.
Those
Reports .and the deeds described pelow (see attached copies) show
that the water rights corresponding to 1,4·29 of the 2,377 t<;>tal
issued shares of . the Company, or 60.12% (i.e. the Davis shares),
are now held by Mr. Carlson:

Warranty Deed d~ted November 12, 1962 from Ernest Davis, Jr.,
Olive M. Davis, Devon Davis and Jean R. Davis to W-M Ranches,
Inc. (recorded in Carbon County at Book 81, page 274). This
deed expressly transfers 1,429 shares of the Compa,ny to W-M
Ranches, Inc.
Quit-Cl~imDeed dated August 1, 1968 from W-M Ranches, Inc. to
Neville L. Wimmer aI;J.d Harold J. Wimmer (recorded in Carbon·
County at Book 186, page 471). This deed expressly transfers
1,429 shares of the Company to Neville L. Wimmer and Harold J,
Wimmer.
·

[':):'he five Reports of wa't er Right Conveyance filed by Mr.
Carlson on June 27, 2000 dooument various conveyances of the
subject lan.d and all appurtenan,:. water rights from Neville L.
Wimmer and Harold J. Wimmer (both of whom are now deceased) to
Lily Mae Wimmer, trustee.]
Warranty Deed dated July 27, 1998 from Lily Mae Wirome:r,
successor trustee of t~e Neville~- Wimmer Revocable Trust
dated June 11, 1981, to Michael M. Carlson (recorded in Carbon
County at Book 414, page 129)'.
This deed transfers ·the
subject property and all appurtena~t water rights, including
"all of Grantor's interest in the Minnie Maud Reservoir and
Irrigation Company and the water rights owned or used by said
company, all shares of said compar,i.y owned by Granter or to
which Granter is entitled, and any interest owned by Grantor
or to which Grantor is entitled in. the water rights and other
assets of said company now held by said company or arising
from any termination or liquidation of said company, past or
present, formal, informal or · defact,o. n

Special Warranty Deed dated July 21, 1998 from Lily Mae
Wimmer; successor trustee of the Neville'L. Wimmer Revocable
Trust dated June 11, 1981, to Michael M. Carlson (recorded in
Carbon ~ounty at Book 414, page 132).
This deed transfers
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various water rights appurtenant t9 the subject property,
including water right Nos. 90-24, 9Q-184, 90-185, 90-186, 90187, 90-188, 90-18"9, 90-190, 90-191, 90-196, . 90-197 and 90299, which are all of the water·rights listed in the Proposed
I)etermination as being owned by Minnie Maude Irrigation
Company.

In light of the foregoing, would you please amend the
Division's records. to show Michael M. Carlson as the owner of
60 .12% of water right Nos. 90-24, 90-184., 90-:J-85, 90-186, .90-187,
90-188, .90-189, 90-190, 90-191, 90-196, 90-197 and 90-299. Would
you. also please p::r:epi;ire segregation filings to segregate Mr .
Carlson's portion of thoi;,e rights from the Company's portion.
Finally, please send me copies . of the segregation· filings and
wrihten confirmation of the ownership changes as soon .as they have
been completed. Mr. Carlson's address is:
·
·

Michael M. Carlson
14800 South 1300 West
Bluffdale, UT 84065
This request is being submitted. prior to the effective date of
the Division's new Report of Water Right Conveyance rule, so I have
not prepared a Report of Water Right Conveyance. Given the unusual
hist·o ry of these corporate rights, a standard Report of Water Right
Conveyance form would not fit well anyway.
This narrative
explanation is provided instead.

know.

Should you need any additional information,
Thank_ you for your help.

please let me

Very truly yours,

f}Ni[)_~
Daniel A. Jensen
Attorney for -Michael ·M. Carlson
DAJ/ca
Enclosures ·
cc:

Michael M. Carlson
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